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Humair: Economic Complementarity and Political Solidarity

ECONOMIC COMPLEMENTARITY AND POLITICAL
SOLIDARITY:
CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF THE FIRST TREATY OF

1850
BETWEEN SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES

CEDRIC HUMAIR

The Civil War known as the Sonderbund and the institutionalization of
the Federal State, in 1848, do not solely constitute important historical
milestones in Swiss domestic politics. These events, which mark the advent
of a modern Switzerland, also had repercussions upon Swiss international
politics and diplomacy and, in particular, upon relations with the United
States of America. Beginning in 1850, the new liberal-radical authorities
concluded a General Convention of Friendship, Reciprocal Establishments,
Commerce, and for the Surrender of fugitive Criminals with the "sister
Republic."' For the first time in their histories, the two countries regulated
several spheres of their relations by legally contractual means.
The rapidity with which this treaty was signed astonishes the historian.
From the Swiss point of view, how can one explain the fact that a partner
located beyond the Atlantic would receive higher priority in treaty making
than the most important neighboring States-Sardinia 1851, France 1864,
the German Confederation 1868, Austria-Hungary 1868? From the point of
view of the United States, which was already a great maritime and
commercial power, what is the explanation for the interest in an agreement
with a small Alpine country whose political influence and consumer
capacity were limited a priori? Despite great difficulties in the ratification of
the treaty, which lasted until 1855, the American authorities did their best to
find solutions leading to the successful conclusion of the negotiations. To
this end, they made important concessions, of which certain ones were
1
The first version of the treaty was amended by the Senate, then renegotiated, before being
ratified by the two States in I 855; Recueil officiel des Lois et ordonnances de la
Confederation Suisse, vol. I/5, 1854-1857, pp. 188-213.
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scarcely compatible with the provisions of the American Constitution, and
broke with the great traditions of American commercial policy. What were
the motivations of each party in acting in this unprecedented manner?
The histcriography devoted to the Swiss-American relations of the first
half of the nineteenth century, which has only been slightly revitalized in
recent years, responds to this question by focusing upon politico-cultural
aspects.2 In the context of the liberal revolutions of 1848, these "sister
Republics" developed closer relations in order to counter the European
forces opposing them. To be sure, this political solidarity did indeed play an
important role in the conclusion of the treaty, but it should not obfuscate the
economic issues which constitute the essential framework of the agreement.
The latter was in fact the result of migratory and commercial relations which
intensified throughout the first half of the century. Stimulated by the strong
complementarity of the Swiss and American economies, the exchange of
labor, merchandise and capital grew so large in volume that the need to
regulate them was felt more and more. With the birth of the Swiss Federal
State, the interest of the United States in concluding a treaty became more
intense, because it was a question of protecting American exports from an
eventual commercial reorientation of Switzerland toward other countries.
After the failure of the liberal revolutions, however, the United States'
interest in the "sister Republic" surpassed the parameters of bilateral
relations. In a Europe convulsed by political chain reactions, this small
island of liberalism became a key element in the strategy of American
commercial expansion. The American tobacco exporters were in fact
counting on the fall of the aristocratic powers in order to obtain a
liberalization of the European commercial and fiscal policies regarding their
products. Thus Switzerland became the American Trojan horse in Europe.
By serving as an example and a place of refuge for the liberal elements of
the Old Continent, the Swiss "sister Republic" maintained the hope of new
political upheavals. Thanks to its free-exchange customs policy, Switzerland
also constituted a rift in the otherwise protectionist European economic
system. A veritable free port in the center of Europe, Switzerland imported
and stored the merchandise of the entire world, before re-exporting these
items as smuggled goods to neighboring countries. Because of its strong
taxability, American tobacco was among the most lucrative items in this
illegal import-export commerce. The purpose of this essay is thus to place
the first Swiss-American treaty of 1850 in a long-term politico-economic
perspective, while at the same time explaining the role played by the Swiss
2
MEIER, Heinz K., The United States and Switzerland in the Nineteenth Century, The
Hague, 1963; MOLTMANN, Giinter, "Die Ambivalenz des amerikanisch-schweizerischen
Vertrages von 1850/1855 ," in Revue suisse d'histoire, 26, 1976, pp. 100-133; HAMMER,
Urs, VomAlpenidyll zum mode men Musterstaat. Der Mythos der Schwiez als "Alpine Sister
Republic" in den USA des 19. Jahrhunderts, Basel/Frankfurt am Main , 1995 .
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(1847) and European revolutions (1848) as catalysts in this process. The
second part of this analysis will seek to understand why the process of
ratification required so much time. In Switzerland as in the United States,
the federal political system posed problems for the central authorities, the
regional authorities refusing to abandon certain of their legislative
prerogatives in the domains of residential establishment and inheritance.

The Enigma of the Treaty of 1850: the large Number of American
Concessions to a small Alpine Country

In the summer of 1857, in other words two years after its ratification, the
treaty between the United States and Switzerland became the talk of the
entire nation and agitated American public opinion, which debated upon its
constitutionality. 3 Part of the Jewish community, led by the editor of the
Review "Israelite," spearheaded an opposition movement: "Israelites,
freemen and citizens ! Let not the disgrace of the treaty between the United
States and Switzerland remain upon the Jewish citizens by unprincipled
diplomatists. Hold public meetings; give vent to your sentiments, resolve
upon a proper course of action against the mean and illegitimate instrument
made in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Try to win the
press in favor of your cause and rest not until this outrage is blotted from
the United States records. Slaves and cowards only will submit to such an
outrage. We are men and must be treated as such. "4 This discontent was the
result of a decision by the authorities of the Swiss city of La Chaux-deFonds, which refused to grant the right of establishment to an American
merchant, solely because he was Jewish. Although shocking, this municipal
decision was not contrary to the provisions of the treaty dealing with
establishment, because the latter document granted to American citizens
residing in Switzerland only the equivalent of the rights of Swiss citizens.
Thus, due to contemporary anti-Semitic prejudices, the new constitution of
1848 granted freedom of establishment only to Swiss citizens of the
Christian faith. Consequently, the treaty of 1850, the judicial equivalent of a
law in American terms, ratified the discriminatory practices of certain Swiss
cantons in dealing with the American Jewish population. From the point of
view of its opponents, the agreement was not compatible with the
3

Concerning this protest movement, cf. STROOCK, Solomon M., "Switzerland and
American Jews," Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society, 11, 1903, pp. 752; SCHAPPES, Morris U. (ed.), A Documentary History of the Jews in the United States
1654-1875, New York, 1950: "States' Rights vs. Equality Abroad," pp. 315-324.

4

Israelite, August 7th , 1857, cited in STROOCK, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
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constitutional provisions which assure equality to American citizens of all
religions. In the course of the period August to October 1857, the debate
intensified and protest meetings were organized in several American cities.
Inspired by the "New York Herald," part of the American press likewise
proclaimed the theme of the unconstitutionality of the agreement and
demanded the termination of the agreement: "We cannot imagine that any
very enormous proportion of our citizens desire to become bondholders and
merchants in Switzerland ; the trade of this country would probably survive
an entire interruption of intercourse with the pleasant people of the Alps
and the Lakes. We think it better that such an interruption should take place
than that we should be betrayed into a precedent which would soon be
turned against us. Rather than let the foreign Powers compel us to
discriminate among our own people, and impose on them religious
disabilities, let us forsake Switzerland altogether , and blot it out of our
maps. And to begin with, let Mr. Buchanan lose no time in notifying the
Swiss government that the treaty is at an end. "5 Nonetheless, the force of
public opinion did not succeed in convincing President Buchanan to
terminate the treaty.
In 1879, the treaty of 1850 once again returned to the forefront of the
American political and judicial scene, by opposing the defenders of the
doctrine of "States' Rights," who struggled against any encroachment by the
central government upon the sovereignty of the States, and the partisans of
the "treaty making power" accorded to the central government by Article 6
of the American Constitution .6 The object of the litigation Hauenstein v.
Lynham, submitted to the Supreme Court in Washington, was the
interpretation of Article 5 of the treaty, which regulates the procedures of
inheritance of the nationals of the two countries within the territory of the
5

New York Herald , August 81\ 1857, "The Jews and the United States Government-The
Swiss Treaty"; cf. also the article signed L.C.N . of August I Ith , "Our Treaty with
Switzerland as it Affects the Jews" as well as the one written by Dr. M. Mayer on August
19th, "The Jews and the United States Government. The Swiss Treaty " ; other newspapers
took a position clearly against the treaty: Charleston Daily Courier, August 13th, "The First
Fruit of the Treaty between the United States and Switzerland " ; The Sun (Baltimore), August
19th, "The Treaty with Switzerland "; several newspapers published on the other hand
articles in favor of the treaty or defended the good intentions of the government: Ameri can
and Commercial Advertiser (Baltimore), August 171\ I 857; New York Daily Times, August
24 1\ 1857; National Intelligencer , August 251\ 1857.
6

Article 6 stipulates: "That all the treaties made or which shall be made under the authority
of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding': cited in WASHBURN Albert H., "The American Interpretation of the
Most Favored Nation Doctrine ," Virginia Law Review, I, January 1914, pp. 282-283 ;
concerning this affair, cf. also HAYDEN Ralston, "The States ' Rights Doctrine and the
Treaty Making Power," in The American Historical Review, 22, 1916-1917, pp. 566-585 .
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other party. The State of Virginia, which refused to grant the right to own
real estate to any foreign citizen, contested that the agreement permitted
Swiss heirs to sell their inherited real estate within a certain period of time
and thus to avoid its seizure. Nonetheless , the Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the heirs, confirming the power of the central authorities of the era to
encroach, by means of the treaty, upon the legislative competence of the
individual States.
In 1899, the application of the Franco-American Treaty of 1898 brought
to light a third peculiarity of the Swiss-American agreement of 1850.
According to the so called American practice of the restrictive clause of the
most favored nation, third party States have the right to the customs
reductions granted to French products only if they themselves make
concessions similar to those agreed upon by France in compensation for the
decrease in the American fees. Yet, to the great surprise of the
administration of that era, Swiss authorities affirmed that the Treaty of 1850
contained a clause which gave them the right to reductions without such
equivalent compensation. 7 Upon investigation, 8 the Secretary of State had to
admit that Switzerland did indeed constitute an exception to the American
commercial practices of the nineteenth century: "It is also my duty to advise
you that the foregoing recognition of the equity of the claim of your
Government compels us at the same time to regard the Articles 8-12 of the
treaty as henceforth constituting an exception to the otherwise uniform
policy of the United States. This policy has been to treat the commerce of all
friendly nations with equal fairness, giving exceptional ''favors" to none.
Should this Government continue to give to Swiss products gratuitously all
advantages which other countries only acquire for an equivalent
compensation, it would expose itself to the just reproaches of other

7

Concerning the American practice of the most favored nation clause and the Swiss
exception, cf. WASHBURN , op. cit., pp. 257-296; JACQUELIN Dorothy Grant, SwissAmeri can Economic Relations , Geneva, 1939, pp. 17-33.
8

The special treatment granted to Switzerland is clarified in the report of the negotiator of
the Department of State; cited in MILLER , HUNTER (ed.), Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States of Ameri ca, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington , 1937, pp. 861-862; it is also highlighted by the Swiss Federal Council in its
message to the Chambers: "In the treaties of the United States with other nations, this
stipulation is made with the reservation that if the favor has been granted freely to another
nation, the extension to the contracting party takes place without indemnity , but that if it has
been the object of a condition , the extension takes place only by means of an equitable
compensation. Although much importance is attached to this clause in the United States, M.
Mann renounced it out of consideration for Switzerland "; Feuille federate suisse, 1850, vol.
3, "Message accompagnant le Traite entre Jes Etats-Unis d' Amerique et la Confederation
suisse du 3 decembre 1850," p. 635.
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Governments for its exceptional favoritism. "9 Following this affair, the
exceptional status of Switzerland was suppressed in a mutually amicable
manner (1900).
The three above-mentioned affairs testify to the exceptional character of
the first treaty between the US and Switzerland. Exorbitant commercial
terms, a clause encroaching upon states' rights and discrimination against
the Jewish population all combined to make of this Swiss-American
agreement a bizarre anomaly in American foreign policy. In order to
understand the reasons which motivated the American authorities of the era
to make such concessions to a small Alpine state, it is necessary to put in
perspective the economic issues governed by the treaty. Contrary to what
the public might have been led to believe by the affirmations of the "New
York Herald," it was in the best economic interest of the two partners to
conclude such an agreement.

The Export of Labor, Merchandise and Capital to the United States: the
Keystone of Swiss Economic Activity

In the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, the United States
represented far more than a "sister Republic" in Switzerland. Whereas the
American democratic institutions only caused to dream a small minority of
Swiss liberal milieux, desirous of emancipating themselves from aristocratic
tutelage, the capacity for absorption of this new economic power, whether in
terms of labor, in terms of merchandise or in terms of capital, provided the
source of livelihood of a significant part of the Swiss population. Strongly
dependent upon its external economic relations, Switzerland compensated in
this manner for the deficit resulting from the protectionist economic policies
practiced, from the end of the eighteenth century, by the surrounding great
European powers. The United States thus became the principal economic
partner of certain Swiss cantons.

Swiss Emigration to the United States: Problems surrounding Inheritance
and the Extradition of Criminals
In the domain of emigration, the needs of the two republics
complemented one another well. Whereas the United States possessed vast
agricultural lands, progressively enlarged by the conquest of the West, but
little human capital to improve them, Switzerland suffered from the rarity
9

John Hay (Secretary of State) to the Federal Council, November 21st , 1898, cited in
MILLER, HUNTER (ed.), op. cit., p. 903.
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and the mediocrity of its cultivatable soil which was insufficient to nourish
its demographic surpluses. The transatlantic emigration of Swiss peasants
thus served the interests of the two partners. In certain mountainous Swiss
regions, in particular, this human export, which was substituted more and
more for mercenary service abroad, constituted a welcome social valve.
Although Swiss emigration to the United States goes back to the
seventeenth century, it did not attain quantitatively important proportions
until the first half of the eighteenth century, with the arrival of the first wave
of emigrants estimated at 15,000 Swiss, in other words on the average about
300 persons annually .10 After abating during the second half of that century,
the exodus recommenced in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. In numerous
Swiss cantons, revenues from the soil were at that time insufficient to
provide sustenance for the most disadvantaged portion of the population. In
1846 and 1847, Switzerland was struck by another famine, which reignited
the migratory phenomenon. During the years from 1845 until 1855, it is
estimated that 78,000 Swiss emigrated, of which number about 85% settled
in the United States. From the American point of view, the 6,000 Swiss who
landed annually on American shores represented 2% of total immigration,
which is not negligible. 11 The newly arrived immigrants, the majority
peasants, headed especially toward the States of New York, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Illinois, Missouri and Wisconsin. 12 The liberty accorded to foreigners
to acquire land was an essential criterion of these immigrants' choice of
residence.
In order to deal with the problems engendered by this heavy movement of
population, the Swiss consular system was progressively enlarged to the
principal European ports and to the large cities of the United States. In 1823
the first two consulates were opened in New York and Alexandria (port of
Virginia near Washington), followed by New Orleans (1829) and
Philadelphia (1841). In 1850 the Federal Council decided to reorganize the
consular system in the United States: at that time ten zones were defined,
each one corresponding to a consulate. 13 First of all, the task of the consuls
was to protect the new arrivals from the numerous swindlers by whom they
10
HAAS Leonard , "Die Schweiz und die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika. Ein
geschichtlicher Rtickblick," in Revue suisse d'histoire, 20, 1940, p. 240.
11
These figures are determined using estimates made by Heiner Ritzmann (ed.); Statistique
historique de la Suisse (SHS), Zurich , 1996, p. 368. It should be noted that there exists a
strong discrepancy between the Swiss and the American statistics owing to the fact that the
Swiss were often registered under the category "Germans" because of the proximity of the
two languages.

12
ARLETIAZ Gerald, "Emigration et colonisation suisses en Arnerique 1815-1918," in
Etudes et Sources, 5, 1979, pp. 7-67.
13

MEIER, op. cit. , pp. 15-17/123-133 .
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were threatened and to support them if they were in need. Secondly, they
supervised the economic activity of their compatriots by making them
benefit from their knowledge of the local regulations.
A thorny problem, which Swiss emigrants in those days often confronted,
was that of their inheritance. In certain American States, legislative
provisions in fact prevented Swiss heirs from freely disposing of the
fortunes which were left to them. The case of real estate was particularly
delicate, since such property was forbidden to foreigners and seized by the
local authorities. Beginning in 1833, the Swiss Confederation therefore
sought an agreement on this matter. 14 On the American side was also shown
interest in suppressing the fiscal practices prejudicial to the growing number
of American merchants established in Europe: the right of "bargain"
(seizure by the State of all or part of the fortune of a deceased foreigner) and
the fairground draft (fee imposed in case of the expatriation of the fortune
going as high as 20% of the total monetary sum). In addition, European
immigrants having acquired American nationality sometimes encountered
difficulties in gaining possession of goods inherited in their countries of
origin. Thus, between 1789 and 1835, the United States concluded fourteen
treaties containing provisions concerning inheritance and estates. On March
6t\ 1835, an agreement was signed in Paris by the diplomatic
representatives of the two countries, with the approval of all the Swiss
cantons. The first article abolished implicitly the right of bargain and the
fairground draft, while the second gave to Swiss heirs the right to sell
inherited real estate and to repatriate its value, whatever law might be in
effect in the concerned State. Although the content of this 1835 agreement
resembles in every respect those concluded previously, the Senate refused it
in the course of 1836, by 23 votes against 14, which constitutes a precedent
in this legal arena. Historiography attributes this failure to the reinforcement
of the doctrine of "States' Rights" in the Senate at that time. The large size
of Swiss immigration to the United States also perhaps played a role in the
decision.
Under the administrations of John Taylor (1841-45) and James Polk
(1845-49), the United States systematized their relations with the European
States in the sphere of inheritance. 15 In the summer of 1845, the Secretary of
State James Buchanan (1791-1868) reopened discussion on the agreement of
1835 during commercial discussions with the Swiss consul in Alexandria:
"So many of the citizens of Switzerland have emigrated to the United States,
14
MILLER, HUNTER (ed.), op. cit., 169-178; HAAS, op. cit., pp. 252-253; MEIER, op.
cit., pp. 21-25; HAYDEN, op. cit., 566-575.
15
Relevant clauses appear in the treaties concluded with the German States of Hesse (1844),
Wilrtemberg (1844), Saxe (1845), Bavaria (1845), Nassau (1846), Hannover (1846), as well
as with Austria (1848); HAYDEN, op. cit., note 5, p. 568.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol42/iss3/2

8

Humair: Economic Complementarity and Political Solidarity

2006]

Economic Complementarity

11

that both real and personal estates in the one country, must often devolve to
the citizens of the other. The rights of these respective citizens can be best
secured by treaty. Indeed, constituted as both Republics are, of separate
sovereign States, varying from each other in their domestic institutions, it is
almost indispensable to the security of the rights of the respective citizens,
that these should be recorded and regulated by a Treaty, which would
render the rule uniform throughout the whole. " 16 On May 181\ 1847, an
agreement similar to that of 1835 was signed in Washington: a period of
three years was granted for the sale of real estate properties inherited by
Swiss residing in the United States. On April 261\ 1848 this agreement was
accepted without modification by the Senate.
From the middle of the 1840s, the intensification of the migratory flows
was the origin of a second problem which was the object of regulatory
efforts, specifically the extradition of criminals. Following the Koster affair,
involving a crook who escaped American justice by taking refuge in
Switzerland , the government of the United States took the initiative of
negotiations (1844 ). 17 The negotiations , which once again took place in
Paris, resulted in the agreement of September 151\ 1846. The latter
agreement however found opposition in the Senate. After having been
amended, March 3rd , 1847, it was finally abandoned, because the extensions
for ratification were too short in order to undertake new procedures. This
failure was part of a well defined strategy of the United States, of which
Buchanan became the spokesman: "Several of the Continental Powers of
Europe have attempted to conclude treaties of extradition with us; but the
negotiations have failed because they would not consent to the surrender of
their own subjects or citizens who, after having committed crimes in the
United States, might escape to their own country. " 18 The agreement of 1846,
which would have assured impunity to Swiss emigrants who returned to
their own country after having committed crimes in the United States, could
therefore not satisfy the American administration.

16
National Archives (NA), RG 59/M99 (Notes to foreign legations/ German States) , roll 27;
letter of Buchanan to Cazenove, July 28'\ I 845.

17

MEIER, op. cit., p. 20.

18

Instructions of Buchanan to Rush, September 25'\ 1847, published in MOORE John
Bassett , The Works of James Buchanan, volume VII, 1846-1848, New York, 1960, pp. 419421.
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Securing the Export of Swiss industrial Products to the United States: in
Search of a commercial Agreement

The United States likewise played an essential role in the Swiss industrial
and commercial development of the first half of the nineteenth century. 19
After the Napoleonic Wars, Europe was in fact covered with protectionist
customs barriers whose purpose was to curb the arrival of English
manufactured products and to promote industrialization on the Old
Continent. These measures struck with full force the Swiss cantons, of
which certain ones were then at the peak of European industrialization
(Basel, Geneva, Neuchatel, Zurich, St-Gallen). Yet rather than follow the
protectionist movement sweeping Europe, the Swiss industrialists and
4

·■ Europe
■ America
■ Levant

■ Asia

Geographical Distribution of the Swiss Exports of Merchandise in 1845.20

merchants placed all their hopes on free exchange which, associated with a
very abundant labor force, permitted them to manufacture cheaply.
Moreover, they adopted a strategy of specialization in luxury products
19

VEYRASSAT Beatrice , Reseaux d'affaires internationaux , emigrations et expor tations
en Amerique latine au XlXe siecle. Le commerce suisse aux Ameriques, Geneva , 1993, pp.
61-118; HUMAIR Cedric, Developpement eco nomiqu e et Etat central. Un siecle de
politique douaniere suisse au service des elites ( 1815-1914) , Berne, 2004, pp. 3-299.
20

The data is taken from VEYRASSAT Beatarice, "La Suisse et !es marches du monde.
Exportations globales et repartition geographique au XIXe siecle. Essai de reconstitution,"
in Paul Bairoch, Martin Korner (ed.), La Suisse dans l 'econo mie mondiale , Zurich , 1990,
pp. 287-316.
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(silken fabrics, cotton fabrics of the highest quality, embroidery, lace, watch
making) and became intensely involved in the diversification of their
markets. In this context, the Americas quickly became a lifeline of the first
importance. An assessment of the Swiss markets around 1845 reveals to us
that the two Americas absorbed at that time 46 % of all Swiss exports.
With a territory in full expansion, a principally agricultural economic
structure, consumers of European origin, a high degree of buying power and
a customs policy oriented toward free exchange-tariff revisions of 1833,
1846 and 1857-the United States constituted an essential market for Swiss
industrial products. All the more so because local industrial competition was
still weak and was concentrated in the production of standardized objects of
great consumption. The large volume of Swiss exports nonetheless cannot
be precisely calculated. On the American side, it was only in 1857 that the
American customs agency introduced a rubric specific to Swiss imports,
whose reliability was immediately questioned. While the official figures
proclaimed the sum of 5.9 million dollars, Swiss exports to the United States
were assessed at 15.3 million dollars by the Swiss consul in New York and
at 17 million dollars by the American consul in Basel. 21 In the absence of
reliable statistics, the American consuls, the first of whom was installed in
Basel in 1830, were the principal source of information for the American
administration. Each time that the latter were called upon, they nonetheless
complained of the pitiful state of the system of Swiss commercial statistics
and the culture of secrecy reigning among the Swiss industrial and merchant
class. 22 The only point of reference which was at the disposal of these
21

Federal Archives (AF), E 2200 New York 1/152, DeLuze to Fornerod, February 81\ 1856,
published in Documents diplomatiques suisses, vol. 1, Berne, 1990, pp. 589-592; NA RG
59ITT64 (Dispatches from Basel) , Endlich to Cass, September 10th , 1859. This distortion is
notably due to the considerable share of Swiss products taken care of by intermediate
commerce, especially French, but also British, German and Dutch commerce; NA RG 59/
T364 (Dispatches from Basel) , Goundie to Buchanan , January 28 1\ 1846; ibidem , Endlich
to Cass, September 10th , 1859. The second cause is the sub-invoicing of Swiss exports ,
which permitted the decrease ad valorem of the fee to be paid at American customs. Its size
can be estimated beginning with the introduction of the system of samples : in 1866, the
value of certified exports jumped by nearly 15 %, whereas the volume remained relatively
stable. In addition, let it be mentioned that the shipment of Swiss products from the ports of
Bremen or Hamburg, under German labels, permitted Swiss exporters not to pay the customs
surtax of 10 % imposed on merchandise loaded on non-American ships (navigation
agreements concluded between the United States and certain German States). Silk goods
being taxed at 25 % of their value in the tariff of 1846, which remained in place until 1857,
the savings were 2.5 % of the declared value; AF D 1978, Cazenave to the canton of Zurich,
July 11th , 1840 ; AFD 1978,DeLuzetothecantonofBeme
, June 15th , 1847.
22

From 1851 until 1884, Swiss statistics indicated only the gross weight (depreciation
included) of merchandise which traversed different borders, and not the country of final
destination. Beginning in 1885, the commercial flows were also expressed in terms of value,
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American consuls was the value of the merchandise for which they
delivered certificates to the Swiss exporters, by virtue of the "Revenue
Laws." 23 However, it was only beginning in 1866 that this indicator
acquired a certain degree of reliability. 24 Until that date, the American
authorities therefore had the tendency to underestimate the importance of
the commercial relations with Switzerland.
A posteriori, the historian likewise encounters a number of difficulties in
assessing the Swiss exports to the United States. A rather favorable
documentary conjunction permits us to realize this exercise for the year
1858. For that date, shipments originating in Le Havre, which was at that
time the principal transit port for Swiss merchandise, can be assessed at 57.4
million SF (10.9 million dollars). 25 Upon adding shipments from other ports,
as well as the products taken care of by intermediate French commerce, the
total exports from France should approximate 65 million SF. To that amount
must be added at least 25 million SF which passed through British ports, or
were re-exported by English merchants,26 and about 10 million SF for the
other Atlantic ports (German and Dutch), of which Bremen, which
but it was necessary to wait until 1892 to have reliable indications concerning the geography
of Swiss foreign commerce.
23

The systematic study of the American consular reports from Basel (from 1830 on), Zurich
(1852) and Geneva (1855) permits us to reconstruct a series of the certified exports between
1830 and 1866; whereas it is very sketchy unti I 1850 ( 183 I, 1833, I 842, 1844), it is nearly
complete from this date on (except for 1853).

24

Until 1862, certification was required only for merchandise sent on consignment, or less
than a third of exports. Until 1866, the absence of control (system of samples) permitted
exporters to sub-invoice shipments. The consuls complained moreover that the certification
was massively avoided by Swiss exporters. They estimated, in a probably exaggerated
manner , that half or even two thirds of the merchandise which was supposed to be certified
escaped the American consuls in Switzerland. The most often advanced explanations were
certification in the loading ports , the laxity of American customs, which accepted entry
without a certificate or with non regulatory certificates, or even the complicity of American
importers dissimulating the consignation; NA RG 59/ T364 (Dispatches from Basel),
Burchard to Webster, September 3 rd, 1850, April 15'\ 1851, October 1st , 1851; NA RG
59/T452 (Dispatches from Zurich) , Goundie to Cass, March 1st, 1859.
25

VEYRASSAT, 1993, op. cit., p. 113; Consul Endlich used the same document and arrived
at the very similar sum of 11.2 million dollars .

26

IMLAH Ann G., Britain and Switzerland 1845-60, A Study of Anglo-Swiss Relations
during some Critical Years for Swiss Neutrality, London , 1966, pp . 115-126. By using the
statistics of French transit arriving from Switzerland destined for English ports , Imlah
reconstructed the statistics of Swiss exports to this country, which would rise to 98 million
SF in 1858. She moreover estimated at 80% the rate of the merchandise which was
reshipped towards other markets , at least 50% of which to the United States. The sum of 40
million SF which was calculated however seems thus a little high.
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possessed a direct steam line with the United States, was the most
important. 27 As far as smuggling commerce is concerned, it was certainly
mentioned by certain contemporaries, but it was not significant during the
period of customs disarmament which ran from 1846 until the Civil War. In
1858, it was therefore a sum of about 100 million SF, or 19 million dollars,
which was exported to the United States.28 Even if that sum was slightly
lower at the moment of the negotiation of the treaty, it represents more than
20% of total Swiss exports. 29 From the American point of view, this sum
was also not without importance, since it was equivalent to 7% of the total
imports and 13% of the manufactured imports. 30
On the Swiss side, the importance of the American market was clearly
perceived: "Yet more than half of the totality of Swiss silk fabrics have
found in recent years and continue to find their outlet in America, especially
in North America ( ... ). One conceives that, in the state of things which we
have just described, the news of a treaty of commerce between the German
customs union and the United States, and the news of favors granted by this
treaty to the silk fabrics of this union, have excited serious worries among
our own manufacturers, all the more so because a country situated like
Switzerland at the center of Europe has little chance of finding new
markets. " 3 1 In the summer of 1844, the treaty concluded with the above
mentioned Zollverein was to be sure refused by the Senate, but the pursuit
of these negotiations continued to worry the Swiss exporters, who feared
being subjected to a system of differential rights in the vast American
market. In order to prevent such a situation, Swiss authorities were asked to

27

Another source corroborated the thus obtained figures; on the basis of American statistics ,
to be sure unreliable, an American consul fixed thus the principal origins of Swiss
merchandise: France 63%, Great Britain 28%, Bremen 8% and Hamburg 1%; NA RG 59/
T364 (Dispatches from Basel) , Endlich to Cass, September 10'\ 1859.
28

This assessment is slightly higher than that of the American consul in Basel (17 million
dollars); in 1860, a Swiss economist estimated the exports to the United States to be at 80
million SF; a posteriori , Veyrassat assessed them at 75 million; VEYRASSAT , 1990, op.
cit. , p. 306.
29

The latter were assessed at 418 million SF in 1860 in VEYRASSAT, 1990, op. cit., p. 308.

30

The average of American imports for the years 1850-1855 was 240 million dollars; the
average for manufactured imports rose to 130 million dollars; Historical Statistics of the
United States; Colonial Times to 1970, op. cit., pp. 885-886/ 890.

31

Rapport de la commissionfederale d'experts en matiere de commerce sur Les relations
commerciales de la Suisse avec l 'etranger , Lucerne, 1844, pp. 48-49, cf. also the journal of
the Swiss industrialists , Monatblatt des schweizerischen Gewerbsvereins, "Korrespondenzen
und Nachrichten" , February 1844; also see the report of the American consul in Basel: NA
RG 59/ T364 (Dispatches from Basel) , Otis to Calhoun, May 29th , 1844.
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conclude a treaty of commerce assuring most favored nation status to Swiss
merchants.
After a few informal contacts with the Tyler administration, an official
request was addressed July 25th, 1845 to the new administration of President
Polk.32 The consequent American refusal is commented upon several times
in the reports of then Consul Cazenove: "/ had to apprise you at the same
time of the impossibility of now making a treaty of commerce between the
two nations, to which the present administration of this country is not at all
inclined, not wanting to deprive itself of the opportunity to make an
advantageous treaty for itself, with the German Customs Union for the
introduction of its tobaccos and other products, and in fact having recently
concluded a treaty with the Kingdom of Hanover and other neighboring
powers, of which I have the pleasure to send you a copy. (...) It is possible
that the next administration of this country will be better disposed to make a
treaty of commerce with Switzerland, despite the lack of uniformity of
customs fees of the diverse cantons and despite the fact that Switzerland has
almost nothing to offer to America to convince it to make such a treaty,
which it does not presently possess. "33 The Swiss customs system, which is
under the direction of the cantons, therefore constituted the principal
obstacle to the realization of such a treaty. The Swiss federal government
having nothing to offer in exchange for the most favored nation status which
it requested, the American government had no interest in concluding a
commercial agreement with the Swiss Confederation.
In June 1847, the Chamber of Commerce of Basel reactivated the issue by
calling upon the consul of the United States in Basel, George H. Goundie .
The report which the latter addressed to the Department of State was
certainly favorable to the conclusion of a treaty, but it remained without
effect.34 In July 1849, Cazenave profited from the change of administration
in order to attempt to regenerate the idea of a treaty between the "sister
Republics," without any more success. 35

32

NA RG 59/ M664 (Notes from Foreign Consuls in the USA) , Cazenove to Buchanan, July
251\ 1845.

33
AF D 1978, Cazenove to the canton of Berne, July 22 nd , 1847; ibidem , Cazenove to the
canton of Zurich, April 29'\ 1846; ibidem, Cazenove to the canton of Zurich , May 30'\
1846; ibidem, Cazenove to the canton of Berne, May 19'\ 1847.

34

NA RG 59ff364 (Dispatches from Basel), Goundie to Buchanan, June 12'\ 1847.

35

Library of Congress (Clayton papers) , Cazenove to Clayton, July 9'\ 1849.
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The Export of Swiss Capital to the United States: a poorly understood Flow

From the eighteenth century onward, transatlantic Swiss emigration was
not only comprised of peasants in search of lands to cultivate. A merchant
elite, descended from the great Swiss families, was also more or less
permanently established in the United States and, in particular, in the
business centers of Philadelphia and New York.36 These transplanted Swiss
business men profited from the explosion of the colonial trade networks in
order to practice the wholesale trade between the two continents . Until the
beginning of the nineteenth century, they likewise participated in the
triangular trade which provided the Americas with slaves.37
The activity of this elite rapidly spread to the financial sphere. Members
of the families Hottinger, Escher, Iselin, Cazenove, de Rham, Delessert, de
Luze, Du Pasquier, etc. established themselves in the United States as
private bankers. They financed international trade and participated with
other Swiss immigrants in the real estate speculation which characterized
the United States of that era. They likewise served as intermediaries to the
Swiss investors desirous of investing their capital in the United States. In
fact, the strong accumulation of capital realized in Switzerland, thanks to the
mercenary force, to commerce and to the proto-industry, contrasted with the
thirst for capital of the American economy, which notably had to finance its
great infrastructures. Thereby there resulted an export of Swiss capital to the
new continent. The railroads and the public funds were the most common
investments. In 1844, about twenty Geneva capitalists spoke with the Swiss
authorities to persuade them to transmit their claims to the American
government. These Swiss investors complained of not having received the
interest from their American investments within the agreed periods. 38
The volume of these international financial flows has not yet been clearly
measured in Swiss historiography. A recent study nonetheless gives an idea
of the importance of the American investments in the wallets of the Geneva
capitalists. In 1857, the latter had more investments in the United States than
in Italy, the Netherlands, and even in Switzerland itself; only France
absorbed more capital from Geneva than did the United States. 39
36

Veyrassat, 1993, op. cit., pp. 63-70.

37

DA YID, Thomas, ETEMAD Bouda, SCHAUFELBUEHL , Janick Marina, La Suisse et
l' esclavage des noirs , Lausanne, 2005 ; FASSLER Hans, Reise in Schwar z-Weiss, Schwei zer
Ortstermine in Sachen Sklaverei, Zurich , 2005.

38

NA RG 59/ M664 (Notes from Foreign Consuls to the USA), Cazenave (Consul to
Alexandria) to the DS, January 29'\ 1844.

39

PERROUX Olivier, "Les investissements genevois au XIXe siecle. L' apport des
declarations de successions (1846-1887)" , in Hans-Jorg Gilomen , Margrit Millier, Beatrice
Veyrassat (ed.), La globalisation-chances et risques. La Suisse dans l 'economie mondiale
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The European Policy of the United States: Tobacco Diplomacy and
Springtime of the Peoples.

In March 1851, when he learned that a treaty of Swiss-American
commerce had been signed at the end of 1850 in Berne, the Swiss consul in
Alexandria could not suppress his surprise: "I was consequently very
surprised when I learned that the United States had concluded in Berne a
treaty with Switzerland, probably upon the encouragement of good general
Taylor. ,,4-0 Why did President Zachary Taylor (1784-1850) not pursue the
wait-and-see strategy of his predecessors? In order to attempt to respond to
this question, the secondary literature devoted to the treaty of 1850 is not
very substantial, since it is limited to a few articles or chapters of more
general works. In addition, the majority of the analyses focus upon one
element of explanation while neglecting the others. On the American side,
several historians have concentrated on the problems of domestic politics
engendered by its ratification: discrimination against the Jewish population
and limitation of the prerogatives of the States in matters of inheritance. 41
They have notably sought to determine the responsibility of the different
actors in the ratification of the treaty. The role of the negotiator has thus
been overestimated, the latter being either a scapegoat for the Jewish
historians , or a hero come to the rescue of the European Revolution of 1848
for the liberals. This last interpretation, which stresses the context of
international politics, is notably defended by historians specializing in
Swiss-American relations. 42 As for the economic issues of the treaty, they
are only very marginally evoked in the secondary literature. The change of
direction of American policy toward the Swiss Confederation however
cannot be understood without an analysis of the defense of American
economic interests in Europe. In fact, the treaty of 1850 is part of a long
term commercial strategy serving the planters and exporters of American
tobacco, whose economic importance and political weight were at that time
considerable.

18e-20e siecles, Zurich, 2003, pp. 171-190.
40

AF E2 1504/1, Cazenove to the Federal Council , March 21", 1851.

41

MILLER , ffiJNTER (ed.), op. cit., pp. 845-904; STROOCK, op. cit., pp . 7-52;
SCHAPPES, op. cit., pp. 315-324; HAYDEN, op . cit., pp. 566-585; JACQUELIN, op. cit.,
pp. 17-33; SHEWMAKER , Kenneth E., STEVENS Kenneth R. (ed.), The Papers of Daniel
Webster, Diplomatic Papers , Volume 2, 1850-1852, Hanover/ London , 1987, pp. 157-171.

42

MOLTMANN, op. cit., pp. 100-133; MEIER , op. cit., pp. 26-40.
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Exporting Tobacco to Europe: at the Center of American commercial Policy
In the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, the economy of
the United States was marked by profound structural evolutions. In the
North, the process of industrialization, begun during the Napoleonic Wars,
progressively eclipsed the domination of the great international commerce,
whose principal activity, maritime transport (import-export) declined in
terms of relative importance. In the South, the planters and tobacco
merchants, who occupied a key position during the colonial period, faced
competition from the formidable explosion of the cotton culture, begun at
the tum of the century. To the West, finally, developed a new economic
pole, essentially based on the production of cereal grains, which
progressively gained importance with the extension of the territories. 43
Although it does not take into account the respective weight of the different
sectors in the domestic market, the evolution of exports does permit us to
show the above mentioned economic displacements.
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the tobacco culture
played an important role in the development of the American economy. To
be sure, the Napoleonic and Anglo-American Wars (1812) stunted the
development of this agricultural branch, and its relative importance was no
longer comparable to that of the colonial era, during which nearly half of
American colonists drew their revenue from its cultivation and its
commercialization. 44 Nonetheless, tobacco did remain an important factor of
economic growth, all the more so in that the figures here advanced do not
take into account three phenomena. With the advent of the tobacco industry,
a more and more considerable part of the exports consisted of manufactured
products of the highest value. The concomitant demographic development
of the United States moreover boosted the sales of this industry in the
domestic market. In 1850, the value of the production of manufactured
tobacco rose to 13.5 million dollars, or 15% of the exports of tobacco

43

NORTH Douglas C., The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860, New York,
1966, pp. 66-74 .

44

ROBERT Joseph Clarke, The Tobacco Kingdom, Plantation, Market, and Factory in
Virginia and North Carolina, 1800-1860, Durham, 1938, pp. 3-11. The table on page 120
shows us that the number of hogsheads (receptacles from 1000 to 1400 pounds) exported in
1792 will be equaled again only in 1840. The weight of the hogsheads having increased
during the same period, it was in fact at the end of the 1820s that exportation reached the
level preceding the rupture of the years 1793 to 1815. Concerning the importance of tobacco
during the colonial era, cf. also MEYER Jacobstein, The Tobacco Industry in the United
States, New York, 1968 (re-edition), pp. 11-31/32.
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leaves. 46 Finally, the cultivation of tobacco was a form of agriculture much
more intensive than cereal grains or cotton. It therefore permitted the farmer
to make clearly higher profits per square meter. 47
At the political level, the milieux linked to tobacco constituted an
efficient and generally well represented lobby in the high spheres of the
federal administration. Despite the relative decline of this branch of
agriculture, the great fortunes of the South, which were created in this
particular market, continued to have important political weight. Moreover,
the cultivation of tobacco was concentrated in a few states for which it had a
vital importance, which assured it the unconditional support of the ensemble
of the political personnel. In 1849, seven states of the mid-Atlantic coast and
the South produced 96.8 % of the tobacco harvest: Virginia (28.47%),
Kentucky (27.8%), Maryland (10.7%), Tennessee (10.1 %), Missouri (8.6%),

45

Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970, op. cit., pp. 886/ 890/
899.

46

ROBERT, op. cit., p. 164; between 1850 and 1855, exports of tobacco manufactured
products stabilized at around two million dollars, or about 1% of the total of exports of
merchandise; MEYER, op. cit., p. 41.
47

In the 1850s, the value of the harvest per acre was 8 dollars for cereal grains, 15 dollars
for cotton and 50 dollars for tobacco; MEYER, op. cit., p. 38.
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North Carolina (6%) and Ohio (5.2%). 48 To that it is necessary to add a less
massive production, yet of superior quality, and therefore very lucrative
production, in the states of Connecticut and Pennsylvania. The latter were
destined for the centers of the cigar industry in Philadelphia and New York.
At the end of the 1830s, the tobacco branch of agriculture entered a
period of profound crisis. Because of the extension of its cultivation to the
West, a tendency toward overproduction provoked a fall in price, which
lasted throughout the following decade. 49 Simultaneously, the development
of cotton cultivation caused the price of land and slaves to climb. The
difficulties experienced by the tobacco trade provoked a political reaction,
whose epicenter was located in Maryland. It was a question of attacking the
fiscal and commercial restrictions which the European states, at that time the
principal outlet for the market, were imposing upon American tobacco. 50
After the Napoleonic Wars, which provoked a vast debt, tobacco in fact
became a privileged fiscal object of the European governments. Most of the
European States subjected it either to a monopoly of sale, like in France,
where state control was reinstituted in 1810, or to exorbitant import fees,
like in England, where a tax of 900% of the value of tobacco was introduced
in 1815. 51 In 1840, the American tobacco growers estimated that the fiscal
revenues drawn from their products in Europe rose to around 30 million
dollars, or 250% of the export value. 52 The Napoleonic Wars were also
responsible for the development of the European production of tobacco.
After having taken advantage of the Napoleonic blockade in order to extend
itself, the cultivation of tobacco was encouraged by several European States,
which protected it by means of customs taxes. 53
Under the pressure of the tobacco milieux, the American government
undertook a vast commercial offensive in the direction of Europe. 54 From
48

The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850, Washington, 1853, p. lxxxiv.

49

ROBERT, op. cit., pp. 143-157.

50

In 1860, 50% of the total of the American tobacco harvest was exported to European
markets; MEYER, op. cit., p. 40.

51

ROBERT, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

52

ROBERT, op. cit., p. 124.

53

In 1841, European tobacco production reached 136,680,000 pounds, or around 60% of the
total for the United States. The principal producers were the German States (40,000
pounds), Austria-Hungary (35,000 pounds) and France (26,000 pounds); MEYER, op. cit.,
p. 36.
54

Three conventions met in Washington, one in 1837 and two in 1840, in order to put
pressure on federal authorities. The most determined activists even required that retaliatory
taxes be introduced against the merchandise of the most restrictive States regarding
American tobacco. In 1842, this perspective was nonetheless refused in a report of the
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1837 onward, a veritable tobacco diplomacy was activated and new posts
were created for the purpose of concluding favorable treaties in American
commercial interests. 55 Very particular attention was accorded to the
important markets of the German Zollverein. The efforts made by the
administrations of van Buren (1837-1841), Harrison (1841-1841) and Tyler
(1841-1845) were not however crowned with success. Concluded in 1844
with the Zollverein, a treaty lowering the taxes on tobacco was refused in
the Senate by a coalition of protectionist industrialists and political
adversaries of President Tyler. Under the Polk administration (1845-1849),
tobacco diplomacy received a new impetus. In March 1847, a special agent
by the name of Ambrose Dudley Mann (1801-1889) 56 was accredited for the
first time. The new thinking head of American commercial diplomacy in
Europe was a fervent defender of the interests of the tobacco lobby: "It may,
possibly, be supposed, from the frequency with which I recur to the matter
that I attach an undeserved importance to an extension of the consumption
Secretary of the Treasury ; HESS Mary Anthonita, American Tobacco and Central European
Policy: early Nineteenth Century, Washington, 1948 , pp. 96-101; ROBERT, op. cit., pp.
123-128.
55

On the period 1837-1844 , cf. HESS , op. cit., pp. 87-165; MOLTMANN

Giinter,

Atlantische Blockpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert. Die Vereinigten Staaten und der deutsche
Liberalismus wii.hrend der Revolution von 1848/49, Diisseldorf, 1973, pp. 42-48.
56

From a family of Virginia , married to a woman of a great Virginia family, Hebe Grayson
Carter, Ambrose Dudley Mann ran a commercial busines s in Kentucky and in Ohio, without
much success. In 1842 , he was appointed by President James Tyler to the post of consul in
Bremen with the support of important personalities (William Cabell Rives (1793-1868),
proprietor of the great Virginia plantation "Castle Hill, " chair of the Committee on Foreign
Relations (1841-1845); James Turner Morehead (1797-1854), the son of a Virginia banker,
Governor of Kentucky ( 1834-1836). In this German port, he contributed to the establishment
of one of the first direct steam lines between the United States and continental Europe (New
York-Bremen) . Equipped with superior knowledge of the German States, he functioned as
a special agent of the administration of Polk (1846-1849), Taylor (1849-1850) and Fillmore
(1850-1852) and concluded treaties with Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin as
well as Switzerland. During his four missions to Germany (2x.), Hungary and Switzerland ,
Mann traversed the Atlantic eight times and traveled 25,000 miles by sea and as many by
land and river. In 1853, he was named Assistant Secretary of State under the Pierce
administration. Between 1861-1865, he functioned as a special agent of the Confederate
States of America in Europe. He attempted to establish friendly relations with England,
Denmark, Belgium and the Pontifical States, without conclusive results. After the victory
of the North during the Civil War, he ended his life in exile in Paris for 24 years and died
in 1889. MOLTMANN, 1973, op. cit. , pp. 92-94; Appleton's Cyclopedia of American
Biography, vol. 4, p. 190; Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography , vol. 2, p. 221; DAB XII, p .
239; NCAB, XXV, p. 371; MOORE John Preston, "My ever dearest friend. The letters of A.
Dudley Mann to Jefferson Davis 1869-1889, " in Confederate Centennial Studies, 14, 1960 ,
pp. 11-24; WRISTON Henry Merritt, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations ,
Baltimore, 1929 , pp. 172/346-51/462/647.
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of our early stapl e in Europe. To remove such an impression, if it exist (sic),
I need only state that the plant is grown in every state and Territory in the
Union( .. .) and that its cultivation , with remunerating prices , may be largely
augmented and with profit to all industrial pursuits. "51 The commercial
strategy defended by Mann was to avoid an extension of the Zollverein
based on the Prussian protectionist model. In order to achieve that, he was
opposed to an American treaty with the German customs union and
developed privileged commercial relations with the States which still
resisted their integration. Several treaties were thus concluded with the small
coastal German States, partisans of free exchange (Hanover 1846,
Oldenburg 1847, Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1847). 58
The importance of Mann in the American operations in Europe was
confirmed by the fact that his diplomatic activity continued after the liberal
revolutions of 1848, and that despite the Democratic defeat of 1849 and the
arrival in power of the Whig administration of President Zachary Taylor
(1784-1850). Originally from Virginia, the proprietor of large plantations in
Kentucky and in Mississippi (cotton), linked by marriage to a great family
of Maryland , the general conqueror of the Mexican War could only pursue
the commercial policy of opening the European markets begun by his
predecessors. His Secretary of State, John Clayton (1796-1856), son of a
Delaware farmer, but also linked to Maryland through his maternal side, was
a fervent supporter of American commercial expansion. After the death of
Taylor and the resignation of Clayton, Mann remained two more years in
the service of President Millard Fillmore (1800-1874), a jurist from the state
of New York, and his Secretary of State Daniel Webster (1782-1852), a
representative of big business and a landowner in Massachusetts. Under this
latter administration, however, tobacco diplomacy no longer seemed to be
such a high priority .

Springtime of the Peoples and its Effects on American Foreign Policy

The liberal revolutions of 1848, which enflamed a great part of the
European continent, were not without consequences upon American foreign
57

NA RG 59/ M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), Mann to
Clayton, October 29th , 1849.

58

Concerning tobacco diplomacy in Germany , cf. MOLTMANN , 1973, op . cit., pp. 42-48 ;
MOORE , op. cit., pp. 224-226/302-303/357-361/382-384 ; NA RG 59/ M37 (Dispatches
from special agents , vol. 14, Dudley Mann), reports of June 27th , 1846, October 20th , 1847,
December? '\ 1847, April I", 1848, May29 th , 1848,July I", 1848,July 14th , 1848andJuly
18th , 1848; NA RG 59 / M77 (Special missions, Dudley Mann), instructions from Buchanan
to Mann of March 24th , 1846, August 12th , 1846, January 9th , 1847.
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policy. Very rapidly, the ground regained by the reaction posed a problem
for the authorities. Should the world leader of democracy restrict itself to its
policy of non-intervention or should it express solidarity with the liberal
movements which were struggling against monarchies? Even if the
prevailing historiography has stressed the inalienable and indisputable
character of the famous "Monroe" doctrine, the question of liberal solidarity
was debated throughout the nineteenth century , and that in a particularly
intense manner between 1848 and 1852.59 The presence of numerous
European immigrants on American soil, of whom a good number were
already naturalized, made this question of foreign policy an important
electoral issue, notably at the time of the presidential election of 1852.
The interventionist camp, which sought to liven up the passive and waitand-see attitude of the political class in power, was led by an informal group
called "Young America." 6° Conceived in the rnid-1840s, this nationalist
movement, in close league with the Democratic Party, was directed by
young intellectuals, whose program was developed along three axes: the
improvement of national cohesion , the territorial expansion of the United
States and the reinforcement of the American position in the world. After
1848, marked by the end of the Mexican War and the European liberal
revolutions, the issues of foreign policy became the main preoccupation of
the movement, which developed a rhetoric of American greatness.
Beginning in 1851, Samuel Cox predicted an imperialist future for his
country: "As in the young Hercules the astrologers read the lines of afterstrength, so in the lineaments of America may now be read those of Empire.
God has written them, in great mountains, rivers, lakes, men and energies,
all over the face of the Union. "61 In the opinion of George Henry Calvert ,
the United States had the moral duty to bring liberty and democracy to the
peoples of the world, even if at the price of war: By having achieved a
larger liberty than has yet been enjoyed, we march in the van of all the
nations of the Earth. With us, humanity unfolds itself in broader, deeper
strata. Liberty cannot but purify, enlarge, invigorate. It harbors an
59
The conflict between interventionists and isolationists at that time gave rise to several
jousts in the Senate and in the forum of public opinion. The most memorable stages in the
controversy were the questions of sending a message of congratulation to the French
revolutionaries (1848), the interruption of diplomatic relations with Austria following the
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inevitable, an involuntary virtue. Even martial conquest it transmutes into
beneficences. Thus, where we conquer, we emancipate. Our taking
possession is not an enthrallment, but a deliverance. We cannot subjugate,
we must elevate. " 62 In public opinion, the aspirations of "Young America"
were relayed by the Democratic Review. Its editor, John O'Sullivan, was the
inventor of "Manifest Destiny," an expansionist concept which justified the
dominion of the United States over the entire North American continent.
The other battle horse of the Review was its support of the liberal
movements of Europe. If armed intervention was demanded by certain
people, the majority tendency proposed to support democratic countries by
strong symbolic gestures: rapid recognition of the liberal powers, the
establishment of diplomatic relations, the conclusion of treaties of
commerce and friendship.
To be sure, at the heart of the institutions, the intellectuals of "Young
America" only had very limited political power. Nonetheless, their doctrine
did infiltrate even this high level of government through the agency of
certain Democrats of the South, who were interested in a more aggressive
commercial policy. This economic fringe of the movement was led by the
Senator from Louisiana, Pierre Soule, a fervent defender of an
interventionist policy in Europe: "What speak you of isolation? Have you
not markets to retain for your present excess of production, and markets to
secure for the surplus of your future wealth? Can you rely on the sympathies
of Princes, Kings or Czars for a continuance of those relations which alone
can enable you to retain the advantages which you enjoy on the old
continent?( ... ) With the progressive ratio of your production compared with
your population, you may have in 1900 an excess of seven hundred millions
in your produce. Where will you find a market for it?" 63 In certain export
economic milieux, the liberal revolutions were therefore understood as a
formidable opportunity to penetrate the European markets. The latter were
in fact convinced that the establishment of new regimes would result in the
liberalization of exchanges and the abolition of the monopolies on tobacco.
In April 1848, certain merchants of Baltimore approached Secretary of State
Buchanan in order to sensitize him to the issue. The latter immediately sent
instructions to Paris: "In writing the postscript to my letter No 12, of the 31"
ultimo, in which a suggestion is made that the establishment of a Republican
Government in France might "prove favorable to the removal of unwise
restrictions in her trade" with the United States, perhaps the article which
was most prominently present to my mind at the moment was that of
tobacco. (. .. ) The present would seem to be an auspicious moment to remove
62
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or modify this monopoly, and to place the trade in tobacco on the same
footing with that in other articles. "64 In the interventionist economic
milieux, the support of the liberal movements was therefore intrinsically
linked to the defense of their commercial interests in Europe .
The opposition to such an interventionist policy was led by the
conservative Whigs of the North. According to them, the United States
should neither allow itself to be intoxicated by the prosperity of the nation,
nor to overestimate its power. Their isolationist strategy served the interests
of the merchant milieux, who were interested in the maintenance of friendly
relations with all the great maritime powers and, in particular, England. The
economic milieux oriented toward the domestic market, including the
majority of the industrialists, supported their point of view. Socio-political
considerations also contributed to cool the interventionism of certain great
landowners of the South. After the revolts of June in France, the leftist drift
taken by the revolution in fact worried the ruling class. Following the
example of Whig leader Daniel Webster, they considered that the French
ruling class were poets and idealists who were putting in danger
fundamental social values, specifically order, liberties and property. 65
At the center of the European diplomacy of the day, special agent
Ambrose Dudley Mann positioned himself as a moderate of the movement
"Young America." 66 From his point of view, the United States had to accord
great importance to European events, because the latter would have decisive
consequences on the future of the United States: "Apart from the
sympathies, cherished by our generous institutions, which we entertain for
the oppressed of all nations, European questions would then assume an
American importance-commercially if not politicall y-not known since the
adoption of the Constitution. "67 From a political point of view, Mann
considered that the defeat of the liberal movements could result in an antiAmerican conservative alliance: "This year is to decide the destinies of
Europe. I tremble for the result. I wish I could feel that we "have no bark on
the sea-no son in the slaughter . " If the rational republicans of Switzerland,
of France, of Germany, of Austria, of Italy, shall be politicall y obliterated,
an alliance will be perfected, at no distant day, having for its covert object,
whatever may be its ostensible one, the prostration of that, which a
monarchical journal designated a few days ago, as the "greatest of all
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earthly nuisances, the Government of the United States. " 68 It should be
noted that in 1863, the attempt of Napoleon III to establish Maximilian of
Austria as the emperor of Mexico demonstrated that Mann was partly right.
From an economic point of view, Mann was persuaded that the victory of
the liberals would bring important successes to American tobacco
diplomacy. In the course of the years 1848 to 1850, he brought up
repeatedly the importance of the abolition of the French and Austrian
monopolies as well as a reduction of the taxation of the German Zollverein
to 25%. 69
In his first post-revolutionary reports, Mann excluded any intervention
which could drag the United States into an armed conflict in Europe. 70 On
the other hand, he was convinced that symbolic gestures were likely to
reinforce the stability of the liberal powers in positions of authority. In his
reports to Secretary of State Clayton, he moreover seemed to accord an
excessive degree of importance to this type of American intervention: "It is
in our power, in my opinion, to save Continental Europe from the yoke of
cruel oppression prepared for her neck. What a mission! What glory will not
accrue to the administration of General Taylor if it performs nobly this
duty? All political subjects are insignificant compared with it. The means by
which it (will) be accomplished, are pacific. "71 However, it is necessary to
note that Mann adopted an infinitely pragmatic position regarding American
intervention. When the latter was contrary to commercial interests, and in
particular to the interests of tobacco diplomacy, he opposed such
intervention categorically. Thus, in the course of 1849, Mann refused a
commercial treaty to the liberal German government: "/ would therefore
conclude no treaty with Germany, permitting her to engage in the triangular
trade, unless she would agree, that no higher or other imposts than 25 per
centum, ad valorem, should be imposed on our tobacco. This would favor
our staple to nearly as great a degree as the 70 cts Hanover and Oldenburg
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duty, as it would cause the cultivation of the plant to cease in Germany. "72 ·
In 1850, he likewise opposed the rupture of diplomatic relations with
Austria: "Commerce, our mighty agent for doing good to the world, must be
unfettered. (. .. ) Would we be acting in a sense of right to the liberalists of
Austria-of crushed Hungary-to shut our light from them, and thus
abandon them to their hard fate, in order to express our contempt for their
scourgers? (...) Let "Peace and Commerce" with all nations, entangling
alliances with none, be our noble aims, and light, with its noiseless
blessings, will follow our march as justice follows truth. " 73 After the
victories of the reaction, and notably the arrival in power of Napoleon ill, in
1851, Mann hardened his position a bit. He even proposed not to recognize
the new French government. 74
During the critical years of the revolutionary movement (1848-51), the
American administrations which succeeded one another all adopted a
prudent attitude on the matter of European intervention, excluding any
action which might involve the United States in a foreign conflict. The
Democratic duo Polk-Buchanan however revealed itself to be rather
enterprising on the matter of political support for European liberals, going to
the very limits of neutrality in the case of the aid given to the German navy.
The Whig duo Taylor-Clayton adopted a more opportunistic attitude, which
privileged American commercial interests. The instructions given to Mann,
in the framework of his mission to Hungary , clarified well their strategy:
"The great changes that have already occurred, and the still greater which
may confidently be expected to take place in European political systems, are
so intimately connected with probable revolutions, in their commercial
plans and prospects, that it is impossible for us to look on as unconcerned
spectators . We have important interests at stake in movements in Europe;
and it is our duty to watch over those interests with a wise vigilance, and to
stand prepared to take advantage of every opening occasion , which may be
presented, to secure, or to improve friendly and useful relations with
Governments likely to become instituted, as well as with those that are
already established. Peace and commerce are the noble aims of our happy
Land. The former, by God's blessing, we enjoy. Let us omit no exertions to
secure the most liberal and beneficial extension of the latter. ( ... ) The object
of the President, as I have said, is to obtain information in regard to
Hungary, and her resources and prospects , with a view to an early
72

NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report of Mann
to Buchanan , May 29 th , 1848.

73

NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from specia l agents , vol. 14, Dudley Mann) , report of Mann
to Clayton, January 10'\ 1850.

74

NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents , vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report of Mann
to Webster , January 3'd, 1852.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol42/iss3/2

26

Humair: Economic Complementarity and Political Solidarity

2006]

Economic Complementarity

29

recognition of her Independence, and the formation of commercial
relations. "75 As for the Whig duo Fillmore-Webster, it proved to be even
more cautious in its support in favor of the liberal forces.

Saving the last liberal Bastion: Switzerland as a political and economic
Trojan Horse in Europe

In 1847, the Swiss Confederation constituted the first revolutionary center
of what is commonly called the Springtime of the Peoples. A majority of
progressive cantons, mainly industrial, liberal and Protestant, began a civil
war against the Sonderbund, an alliance of agricultural, conservative and
Catholic cantons, in order to create a modem centralized State. After a
lightning military victory, the liberal-radicals founded a federal State on the
basis of the Constitution of 1848, whose principal characteristics were
economic centralization, the establishment of a Democratic political system
based on universal male suffrage and the guarantee of individual rights and
liberties. Whereas eminent Swiss jurists had influenced the fathers of the
American Constitution, it was now the tum of the intellectual masters of
radicalism to seek their inspiration overseas, notably by emulating the
bicameral system of the "sister Republic." 76

The Swiss Revolution in Danger: Breaking the diplomatic Isolation of the
new federal liberal State
The political upheavals which occurred in Switzerland did not leave the
great European powers indifferent. Situated at the center of the Old
Continent, the Swiss Confederation plays a geostrategic role of the first
importance. Besides controlling several Alpine passes, the country serves as
a buffer state between France and Austria. A reinforcement of the central
power, which opened the way for a more coherent and independent foreign
policy for Switzerland, was therefore not seen in a positive light in the
European capitals, because it included the risk of a disturbance of the
strategic equilibrium. Moreover, the reactionary powers which had drafted
75
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the Treaty of Vienna were at the very least irritated by the appearance of a
liberal and democratic island which brought to life an entire series of
premises of the French Revolution. Besides the fact that this precedent
might motivate the European liberals to revolt, the monarchs feared that
Switzerland, by accepting the political refugees who were opposed to their
regimes, could serve as an operational base for other revolutionary
movements.
Beginning in 1847, the new Federal State was therefore subjected to
vigorous diplomatic pressure, which threatened on several occasions to
transform itself into military intervention. Confrontation was avoided thanks
to the rapidity of the military victory of the radicals. Moreover, the great
powers proved to be incapable of collaborating in order to intimidate
Switzerland. After the overthrow of several European regimes by liberal
movements, the new Switzerland benefited from a welcome lapse of time in
order to breathe and recuperate. Yet beginning in 1849, with the successive
failures of the European revolutions, the Swiss situation became more and
more uncomfortable. Several crises followed one after the other until 1857.77
After the smashing of the Hungarian revolution by the armies of the Tsar, in
the autumn of 1849, the rumor of an invasion of Switzerland ran like
wildfire through the various European chancelleries. While Austria and the
German States wanted to put an end to the plots , judged subversive, of
refugees in Swiss territory, Prussia sought to restore its sovereignty over the
canton of Neuchatel. After the coup d'etat of Napoleon Bonaparte, in
December 1851, the Swiss Confederation remained the only liberal bastion
left in Europe. France required at that time that the opponents of the new
regime, who had taken refuge in Switzerland, be subjected to tight
surveillance; that failing, she even threatened to intervene militarily. In
February 1853, following some revolts in Lombardy, Austria expelled five
to six thousand Swiss nationals and established a blockade of Ticino. The
threat was so great that in July 1853, the Swiss Federal Assembly opened a
line of unlimited credit to the Federal Council in order to assure the
country's continuing security. This strict iron hand policy lasted until July
1854, when the Crimean War prompted Austria to normalize its diplomatic
relations with the Confederation. Finally, a last major crisis took place,
between September 1856 and April 1857, concerning Neuchatel. Diplomatic
relations with Prussia were broken and military preparations were made in
both camps. A negotiated solution was finally found in extremis.
Thus placed under pressure by the great powers, the new Federal State
did not have much margin for diplomatic maneuvering in order to define its
foreign policy. To be sure, in the course of the year 1848, the policy of
neutrality of the old Confederation was questioned by certain radicals; the
77
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latter in fact wanted Switzerland to actively support the liberal powers
threatened by the reaction. An alliance with Sardinia, a monarchist regime
with liberal tendencies, was notably debated. Inspired by the future federal
councilor Henri Druey (1799-1855), certain milieux even mentioned the
opportunity for territorial aggrandizement. The old Swiss dream of access to
the sea was resurrected: "Are they thinking perhaps of growing, of taking
Savoy, le Faucigny , la Valteline, etc.? It 's worth thinking about twice, in
order not to open the door to territorial changes which would end up
turning against us. (. .. )It would be necessary at least for Switzerland to be
able to go as far as the sea, in order to have a really independent existence
and to receive, in case of need, help from England and the United States, so
that the Swiss flag could flutter above the waves. " 78 However, with the
pressure which was growing after 1849, all policies of aggrandizement were
set aside in order to give priority to a strategy of survival. Neutrality was
adopted as the guide mark for policy making and the Federal Council kept a
low profile on the matter ofrefugee policy.
In its iron hand negotiations with the reactionary European powers,
liberal Switzerland could count on one strong ally, England. As Druey
points out, at the moment of the arrival of a new English minister in Bern, at
the beginning of 1850, this world power accorded importance to the survival
of an independent and neutral Switzerland: "Sir Lyons is very favorably
disposed toward the new Confederation; he told me positively , as a constant
policy of Great Britain, that the integrity, the independence and (he added)
the neutrality of Switzerland are the conditions sine qua non (underlined in
the text, C.H.) of the European balance of power; Lord Palmerston insisted
with all his might on the system of non-intervention in Switzerland. He told
the truth, because he spoke in the true interests of England and we know
that the perfidious Albion is selfish; little do we care provided that that fact
serves our own interests. And in fact, England cannot tolerate the
annihilation of the small States, because their annihilation strengthens the
power of States by which she dreads to be subjugated. "79 The consultation
of the English diplomatic archives confirms the role played by England
during the years of formation and stabilization of the Swiss Federal State.
On several occasions, English action tended to defuse crises. 80
The second cornerstone of Swiss diplomacy was the United States. In the
opinion of the Federal Council, this ambitious nation could not remain
78
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indifferent to the destiny of the new liberal Confederation: "Without
forgetting that the United States of America, a positive and commercial
people, acts essentially out of self-interest and that it would support the
independence of Switzerland if it were ever seriously threatened, only in
those cases where it would be in American interest, we must still not lose
sight of the fact that, not only is it in their material interest that a country
which offers such an abundant outlet for their products of all kinds remain
independent and free, but also that their moral and political interest is no
less involved. The Mexican War, the expedition to Japan, the indefatigable
activity with which the government in Washington seeks to conclude treaties
with all nations shows just how much national pride, the sentiment of honor,
the need for glory and supremacy have developed in a people who seemed,
just a few years ago, absorbed by the cultivation of its soil, its industry, its
commerce, its navigation , its tariffs and its domestic politics. The nation
interested in dominating its neighboring States is no less interested in
making sure that a confederation in another hemisphere remain
independent of the powers which surround it, either so that it can increase
its own influence in Europe or so that these powers, its rivals, do not
acquire a dangerous preponderance for itself. " 81 Thus, public opinion
accorded a great deal of importance to the arrival of an American diplomat
in Switzerland and to the conclusion of a treaty: it was a matter of ending
the international isolation of the country. 82 The British ambassador assigned
to Berne tended to confirm the political value of such an agreement with the
United States: "The Deutsche Zeitung remarked lately, not without reason,
that, with the Treaty of Friendship between America and Switzerland before
their eyes, the European Powers might perhaps be less in haste to draw the
sword-North America has a weight to throw into the political balance,
such as no other State possesses. Her strength and importance grow hourly:
she may call the New World her own. And though sea and land may lie
between us, the stronger sister will not let the weaker one fall unavenged.
She has long arms, -- her fleets --, which cannot indeed sail through the air,
but which can cry hold! To the Old World." 83
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Is it necessary to intervene in behalf of Switzerland? The American Attitude
concerning the Difficulties of the "sister Republic"
Did the expectations of the Swiss authorities find an echo in the United
States? To be sure, the few American journals which focused on the destiny
of Switzerland during this period took a position in favor of the new liberal
Swiss State. 84 Nonetheless , it is necessary to state that American public
opinion was only slightly interested in the destiny of the Confederation,
preferring to become passionately involved in the French and German
revolutions as well as the desperate combat of the Hungarian liberals.
Beginning in 1852, however, when Switzerland became the last liberal
island in Europe , more attention was accorded to its political survival. In an
editorial of June 13th , 1853, the New York Daily Tribune discussed means to
come to the aid of the Confederation, which at that time was menaced by the
Austrian blockade . If the newspaper rejected all armed intervention, it was
favorable to aid in the form of money and wheat. On February 27 th , 1854,
the New York Times devoted a full page to the relations between Switzerland
and the United States, creating pressure in favor of the conclusion of the
treaty then under negotiation. The same day, the New York Herald pointed
out that two resolutions had been presented to the Senate, for the purpose of
supporting the liberal European States against an eventual invasion by the
great reactionary powers.
On the level of diplomacy, the negotiations aiming at American
intervention were much more precocious and insistent than in the press. A
fervent admirer of the new Swiss regime, the American Consul in Basel,
George H. Goundie , sought to convince Washington of the utility of a treaty
with the Confederation . Beginning in the month of August 1849, a voice
with completely different political weight asked the American government
to become interested in Switzerland. It was that of special envoy Ambrose
Dudley Mann. Confronted with the threats of intervention from the
reactionary European powers , which he considered real, this diplomat was
of the opinion that the United States could not remain indifferent. 85 From his
point of view , Switzerland was called to play an important role in the
European political future. Through its example of pragmatism, it represented
a precious Trojan horse inside the reactionary European fortress: "The
Republic of the United States has cause to be proud of her sister deporting
herself with so much propriety and dignity (... ). Switzerland reflects the
84
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highest degree of credit upon the system of self-government, and thus
encourages struggling patriots to persevere in effecting their deliverance
from the yoke of merciless rulers. She is at present, incomparably, the most
orderly and the most prosperous nation in Europe. Entertaining no utopian
notions of government, she exemplifies, from day to day, to the European
world, the practical beauties of our own institutions. " 86 Mann also
underlined the importance of Switzerland as a place of asylum and refuge,
which was decisive in those days for the maintenance of liberal opposition
on the Old Continent. 87 From the point of view of the secret agent, helping
Switzerland was therefore the best means of supporting liberalism in
Europe. Renouncing such aid would involve the risk of liberating a
reactionary upheaval which could prove to be dangerous to the United
States. 88
Yet how could Switzerland be helped? First of all, Mann considered that
the United States should not in any case become involved militarily, but that
it could influence the course of events in Europe by symbolic gestures. It
was a matter of developing a diplomatic rapport with the "sister Republic."
Independently of the political support which this gesture would bring to
Swiss liberals, it would permit the establishment of a strategic location for
the American information services: "A representative of the United States, if
he were personally worthy of it, would be likely to enjoy the confidence of
the Swiss government to a greater degree than the representative of any
other nation; and, consequently, opportunities would be frequently
furnished him for imparting useful intelligence to his country that could not
be obtained through diplomatic channels elsewhere. " 89 In the second place,
Mann proposed sending a special mission in order to conclude rapidly a
treaty with the new Swiss Federal State. In his private correspondence with
Secretary of State Clayton, the secret agent accorded great importance to
this American diplomatic gesture: "My mission has produced an
extraordinary sensation here. It is the most joyous event that ever occurred
86
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in Switzerland. They will now be saved and General Taylor, yourself, and
the administration, will enjoy the glory as you will the happiness, of having
performed the noble deed. That mission, mark me, will check completely the
monarchists in France, and cause reaction elsewhere to stop in its
unhallowed blood-thirsty career. You have developed America. The pacific
demonstrations which you have made are more terrific to crowned heads
and Princes and Presidents than a dozen British fleets would be. "90 At the
end of his European stay, in 1852, Mann even began to envisage the
abandonment of the non-interventionist doctrine in order to save the last
European liberal bastion: "Switzerland furnishes a brilliant example to
Europe of orderly government upon Washingtonian principles, and she is
consequently the terror and despised of the unfeeling monsters, who have no
other security for their iron rule than that which proceeds from military
repression. She is worthy of our affection. She is worthy of our favor. Yea,
should she ever need them in a life or death struggle, she is worthy of our
sword and our purse." 91
From the time of his arrival in Berne, in June 1853, the American
diplomatic representative, Theodore Sedgwick Fay, developed a diplomatic
stance very similar to that of Dudley Mann. He proposed notably a very
romantic vision of the political bonds between the two democratic nations:
"Switzerland is a prominent point of political and moral sympathy and
contact. The same Providence which sent Columbus and Washington to
build a temple of liberty in the new world, has constructed, in the heart of
the old, a natural citadel, defended by inaccessible mountains and broad
rivers, and a population who have filled history with extraordinary victories
in the cause of freedom. Here amid the powerful adjoining despotisms, the
flame of liberty, everywhere else extinguished, appears preserved for a
divine purpose. I cannot but believe this country is destined to play an
important part in the approaching European struggle and that she will act
on pure trans-Atlantic inspirations. " 92 In his secret report of November 10th
1853, Fay declared himself favorable to American aid in case of armed
conflict with Austria: "After nearly 20 years residence in Europe, may I
adventure to state, with modesty, my opinion on an important point . The
doctrine of American non-intervention will, before long, for good or for evil,
become impossible." According to the minister-resident, the shock between
the United States and the European reactionary governments could not be
90

Library of Congress (Clayton papers), Dudley Mann to Clayton (private), July 13th , 1850,
cf. also the letter of July 6th , 1850.
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NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report of Mann
to the DS (Webster), January 3 rd , 1852.

92

NA RG 59 /T98 (Dispatches from Bern), report of Fay to the DS (Marcy), November 10th ,
1853; cf. also July 19th , 1853, August 13th , 1853.
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avoided much longer: "Europe and America, so rapidly drawing near
together, resemble the positive and negative clouds which cannot approach
without an electric shock. The fluid will leap to the highest peaks, and
Europe has many subjects calculated to attract the explosion. "93 In this
perspective, Fay was of the opinion that the United States had every interest
in maintaining a liberal Switzerland in the center of Europe. In the course of
the Neuchatel affair, in 1856-57, the American diplomat put his convictions
into action. He did not hesitate to contravene his instructions in order to lead
a personal diplomatic action with Prussia, that in order to avoid an armed
confrontation with the Confederation. 94

Preserving American economic Interests in Europe: the Importance of the
Swiss Pawn
The interest of American diplomacy in the new Swiss Federal State was
not only of a political nature, but was also economic in nature. The Swiss
market, very open because of the free-exchange policy practiced by the
former Confederation, was an important outlet for American agricultural
exports. In addition, the complementary economic structure of the two
countries, the development of steam navigation and railroads as well as the
territorial expansion of the United States to the West (bread baskets)
allowed contemporaries to expect a rapid development of bilateral
exchanges. In the absence of official statistics, the evaluation of American
exports to Switzerland was even more difficult than that of Swiss exports to
t~e United States. It reposed in fact on assessments of the American
diplomatic personnel, whose reliability was quite relative. Although the
figures diverge in a substantial manner, all the sources agree on the
importance of the Swiss market. In 1851, Dudley Mann affirmed that the
Confederation was the second best European client of the United States:
"Our trade is larger with the inhabitants of Switzerland, in proportion of
the number, than with those of any other European nation, Great Britain
excepted. The consumption of our products on an average amounts to about
$4,000,000 per annum, by a population of 2,500,000. "95 The mentioned sum
93

Ibidem, November 10'\ 1853.
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BONJOUR Edgar, "Ein amerikanischer Verrnitttlungsversuch im Neuenburger Konflikt
1856/57," in Revue suisse d 'histoire, 1939, pp. 286-297; MEIER Heinz K., op. cit., pp. 5055; NA RG 59 / T98 (Dispatches from Bern), reports of Fay to the DS (Marcy)/ 4.9.1856
/ 8.9.1856 / 16.9.1856 / 23.9.1856 / 30.9.1856 / 28.10.1856 / 6.11.1856 / 25.11.1856 /
25.12.1856/26.12.1856/5.l.1857
/ 13.l.1857 / 14.l.1857 /20.l.1857 /7 .2. 1857.
95

NA RG 59 /M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann) , report of Mann
to the DS (Webster), December 15'\ 1851; the average of total exports to the United States
for the period 1848/52 rose to 176 million dollars , whereas the average of the export of
native merchandise only represented 146 million dollars; Historical Statistics of the United
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of 4 million dollars represents about 2.5% of all American exports for that
year.
The principal product exported to Switzerland in those days was cotton,
which was massively transformed by Swiss industry. In 1847, an American
consul estimated that Switzerland bought as much of it as all the German
States of the Zollverein combined. In 1859, another consul assessed the
cotton import at 2.1 million dollars (average 1854/58), which represents a
little less than 2% of the American exports of cotton and 79% of Swiss
imports. 96 The second product in importance was tobacco, exported in
leaves or in the form of cigars. In 1850, Mann estimated the Swiss import at
5,000 hogsheads (container used for the leaves), which represents about 4%
of the American exports of tobacco (average 1848 / 52). 97 While Great
Britain and France imported respectively 1 hogshead per 1227 and 2000
inhabitants, Switzerland was far ahead with 1 hogshead per 500 inhabitants.
Mann explained these figures by a low taxation of tobacco in Switzerland:
"Tobacco is considered ,in England, France, Austria, and the Italian States
as an article of luxury, and is taxed accordingly. Switzerland, although she
may so consider it, does not tax it, but permits 100 pounds of the article to
enter her territory for one-half the amount of duty that Great Britain
charges for the entrance of a single pound. "98 It is however necessary to
mention two other factors which explain the importance of the Swiss market
for American exports. In the absence of substantial customs protection,
tobacco production was only little developed in Swiss territory. 99 In the
second place, it is necessary to draw attention to the distortion of the
States. Colonial Times to 1970, part 2, Bureau of the Census, p. 885; it should be noted that
the figure advanced by Mann can be slightly overestimated, yet it corresponds rather well
to the calculations effected in 1859 by the consul of the United States in Basel, who arrived
at the figure of 3.4 million dollars .
96

NA RG 59 / T364 (Dispatches from Basel), report of Goundie to the DS (Buchanan), June
12"', 1847; ibidem, report of Endlich to the DS (Cass), September 10"', 1859.
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NA RG 59 /M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report of Mann
to the DS (Webster), November 30"', 1850; the figure for the exports in hogsheads is derived
from ROBERT , op. cit., p. 120.
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NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report of Mann
to the DS (Webster), November 30"', 1850.
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The cultivation of tobacco was concentrated in the cantons of Berne, Fribourg, Tessin,
Vaud and Valais; at the end of the 1850s, the production represented about 15% of all
imports; the tobacco industry was to be found in the same cantons as well as in Basel, in
Neuchatel, in Aargau, in Thurgau and in the Orisons; NA RG 59 / T364 (Dispatches from
Basel), report of Endlich to the DS (Cass), November 1O"',1859; Rapport de la commission
d'experts en matiere de commerce sur les relations commerciales de la Suisse avec
l'etranger, Lucerne, 1844, pp. 33/42-43.
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statistics produced by smuggling. While significant quantities of American
tobacco were illegally introduced in France and especially in Great Britain,
Switzerland imported a great quantity of tobacco which she re-exported as
smuggled goods to neighboring countries. This illegal commerce had public
notoriety during that era: "On the other hand, our system of commercial
liberty, which makes all of Switzerland a sort of free port, where all
merchandise can freely enter and leave the country, also makes it a market
which owes its movement precisely to the customs barriers by which we are
surrounded. The relatively low price of all the items of trade brings us from
everywhere buyers who find the means to evade the most formidable
barriers and who then do not show up in our neighbors' customs tax
registries. We do not possess exact data on the importance which this kind
of market outlet can have, but it is doubtless larger than seem to believe
many people who, not taking into consideration this circumstance, are
surprised by the high level of imports of certain items into Switzerland. " 100
From the point of view of the United States, the Swiss Confederation was
therefore not only a political Trojan horse, but likewise a rift in the
European customs and tax system.
Then, the political upheavals of 1848 constituted a veritable threat for the
American commercial interests in Switzerland. In the first place, the
unification of the Swiss customs system opened the way for a policy of
centralized taxation which could result in a less favorable treatment of
American products. In the course of the elaboration of the first federal
customs tariff, in 1849, the American consul in Basel took steps to limit the
increase of Swiss taxes affecting American products. 101 His efforts, which
paralleled those of Swiss intermediate commerce, were crowned with
success, since tobacco was taxed at less than 10% of its value. But the risk
was great that in case of supplementary financial needs, the new Federal
State would have recourse to the taxation of tobacco, which would have
three negative consequences: slow down domestic consumption, favor the
development of a native cultivation and impede the lucrative smuggling
trade. Beginning in the 1850s, certain voices arose in fact demanding a
higher level of taxation on this luxury item. 102 In the course of the
100

Ibidem, p. 91; concerning the importance of smuggling on the Swiss borders, cf. also
HUMAIR, op. cit., pp. 39-41/204-206; POLLI, Marco, "Zollpolitik und illegaler Handel.
Schmuggel in Tessin 1868-1894. Soziale, wirtschaftlichenstaatliche Aspekte, Zurich, 1989.
101
NA RG 59 / T364 (Dispatches from Basel), report of Goundie to the DS (Clayton), May
281\ 1849.
102
KRAULIGER Franz, DieTabakbestseuerung in der Schweiz, Breitenbach, 1938;
CHALLET-VENEL J. Etude preliminaire concemant un impotfederal sur le tabac, Berne,
1870; OTT Adolf, Zur Frage des Bundeszolles auf Tabak, Zurich, 1879; in 1879, tobacco
was the first position of the tariff to be increased, and that very strongly, in order to cover
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negotiation of the treaty, Mann attempted in vain to introduce a blockade of
taxes on American products imported into Switzerland. 103
In the second place, the centralization of the customs offices opened a
new era of Swiss commercial policy. Until then subjected to the caprices of
the cantons, never capable of reaching an entente or a common strategy, the
Confederation was thereafter able to become involved in the conclusion of
commercial agreements. Beginning in 1851, a treaty signed with Sardinia
granted a few customs advantages to this country. Should it have become
universal, this practice of differential taxation could have threatened
American commercial interests. But what worried even more American
diplomacy was the possibility of an aspiration of Switzerland to form a
customs alliance with one of its powerful neighbors. Even before the
political changes of 1848, the threat of Swiss entry into the German
Zollverein was taken seriously: "Switzerland may continue an independent
Republic for years to come, but there is already a large party, and it is daily
on the increase, brought about by corruption and intrigue, who wish to
connect it with the Zollverein, and I really believe the day is not distant
when such an event will take place, as those states, and particularly
Prussia, will make almost any concession, or promise of protecting and
guarantee for their future independence, in order to obtain that end. Should
it take place, it would operate greatly to the injury of the United States, as at
present all American products enter Switzerland free of duty. " 104 After the
constitution of the Swiss Federal State, this fear continued to dampen
American spirits. In his reports on the negotiation of the treaty, special agent
Mann accorded a quite particular importance to this perspective: "/ have
given to Switzerland nothing, if I am not greatly mistaken, that we have not,
at one time or another, given to nations less entitled to our good will and to
the enjoyment of our liberality than herself (clause of the most favored
nation without restriction, C.H.). In return for the commercial favors which
we obligate ourselves to bestow upon her ( ... ), Switzerland covenants to
grant no favors in commerce to States not embraced within her present
limits which shall not immediately become common to ourselves. This will
prevent her from being drawn into a commercial league with the Zollverein,
repetitive budgetary deficits.
103

The proposition of Mann was the following: "In consideration of the considerable and
growing consumption of Swiss products in the United States, the Confederation promises
and covenants not to raise the import fees which she presently charges for raw leaves of
tobacco , rice, fish oil, cotton and potash produced in the United States."; Feuille federale
suisse, 1850, vol. 3, "Message accompagnant le Traite entre Jes Etats-Unis d' Amerique et
la Confederation suisse a I' Assemblee federale," p. 635.
104

NA RG 59 / T364 (Dispatches from Basel) , report of Goundie to the DS (Buchanan), June
12'\ 1847.
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France, Austria or Sardinia, on terms adverse to our interests. Whatever
product she may admit duty free from any country beyond her
frontier-however great the concession to her from that country for such
admission-she must likewise admit duty free from the United States. " 105 It
should be noted that certain American concerns were shared by the English
diplomatic service, because the latter decided, in 1854, to request the
signature of a treaty of commerce with Switzerland. 106
Besides the commercial risks linked to the political strengthening of the
Swiss Confederation, American diplomats likewise feared the consequences
of the international turmoil into which Switzerland was being drawn. In fact,
the neighboring great powers had no qualms about having recourse to
commercial intimidation in order to bring to heel little liberal Switzerland.
Beginning in 1851, strong customs tensions marked Swiss relations with the
States of the German Zollverein, led by Prussia. 107 In April 1852, Mann
reported to the Secretary of State concerning a blockade orchestrated by
Austria: "Austria, I learn, continues to manifest a desire to establish a
military cordon, in conjunction with France and the adjoining German
States, around Switzerland, with a view to suspend commercial intercourse
between Swiss inhabitants and the inhabitants of other countries. Should
such a measure be consummated, it would operate injuriously to our
material interests, -- cutting off a market for $4,000,000 worth of our
products annually. " 108 In order to confront this eventuality, Mann asked that
the American administration enter into diplomatic relations with Sardinia in
order to avoid that state's participation in the threatened blockade; there was
also the matter of obtaining guarantees concerning the transit from Genoa to
Switzerland. In 1853, when the Austrian blockade was at its height, the
American diplomatic representative in Berne stressed that it was in

105
NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report of
Mann to the DS (Webster), November 30th, 1850; ibidem , December 26th , 1850; the
importance accorded by Mann to this problem is confirmed by a report of the English
ambassador to Berne; PRO FO 100/ 72 (1852), report of Buchanan to theFO (Malmesbury)
on May 12'\ 1852; in 1852, when a request for the opening of diplomatic relations with
Switzerland was deposed by Senator Brodhead, the risks of a customs alliance were newly
mentioned; The Congressional Globe, February 1852, pp. 469-470.
106
PRO FO 100 I 89 (1854), Letter of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to the FO,
May 17'\ 1854; PRO FO 100 I 84, instructions of the FO (Clarendon) to the British
ambassador in Berne (Murray), September 11th , 1854.
107

HUMAIR, op. cit., pp. 237-244; Documents diplomatiques suisses, op. cit., pp. 208210/252-256/31 l.
108

NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, DudJey Mann), report of
Mann to the DS (Webster), April 22nd, 1852.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol42/iss3/2

38

Humair: Economic Complementarity and Political Solidarity

2006]

Economic Complementarity

41

American commercial interests not to see an independent Switzerland
disappear from the map. 109
The Swiss Policy of the United States: Intervention without assuming Risks
Following the political events of 1847, American diplomacy became
intensely interested in the Swiss situation. Convinced that the political and
economic interests of the United States would be threatened by the
disappearance of the new liberal Swiss Federal State, Goundie, Mann and
Fay requested with insistence that the administration in Washington come to
the aid of the "sister Republic," for whom they all professed profound
sympathy. At the most perilous moments for Swiss independence , these
American diplomats even went so far as to question the inviolable principle
of military non-intervention in Europe. How did the different American
administrations react to these diplomatic requests from their own
ambassadors abroad? Because of the sparse nature of available date, it is not
easy to respond to this question. In particular, it is difficult to define the real
motivations of the different presidents and secretaries of state who
succeeded one another. Were they commercial or were they rather political,
or both at the same time? Was this presidential action influenced by the
network of Swiss merchants and bankers in the United States, whose
importance was incarnated in the figure of Albert Gallatin? To what extent
were decisions of foreign policy connected to issues of domestic policy, and
in particular to the presidential elections of 1852 and 1855, for which it was
necessary to gain the votes of the European emigrants and those of the
Jewish community? There are so many gray areas difficult to elucidate. That
all the more so in that the debates of the Senate concerning the treaty with
Switzerland were secret and therefore only consisted of the written minutes
of the decision making process.
Despite these limitations on analysis, it is still possible to delineate the
main lines of the Swiss policy of the United States at that time. The first
constant was the refusal to sacrifice the sacrosanct principle of nonintervention in European affairs . In the instructions that Clayton gave to
Mann, at the beginning of his mission to Switzerland , in July 1850, this
principle was clearly reaffirmed: "We are aware that the total subversion of
Swiss nationality has been threatened; and the sentiments of the American
Government cannot be those of indifference to the fate of the Helvetic
Republic. We do not propose to make any physical demonstration in its
behalf, nor in behalf of the friend of the national civil liberty in France,
Germany and elsewhere. But it must not be imagined that we look upon
109

NA RG 59 / T98 (Dispatche s from Bern) , report of Fay to the DS (Marcy), August 13'\
1850.
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their noble struggles to establish and maintain liberty upon a durable basis
as unconcerned spectators. " 110 In November 1853, when Fay sounded out
the American administration concerning a Swiss request for aid, the
instructions to his confidential report were not placed in the national
archives. It is therefore quite probable that the response was negative.
Finally, at the beginning of 1857, when Fay proposed to the government to
intercede in the Neuchatel affair, the response of Secretary of State Marcy
was unequivocal: "Your suggestion in regard to a proffer of mediation on
the part of the United States, was submitted to the President and received
due consideration from him; but he deemed it inexpedient to take any steps
in regard to it. While this government has steadily resisted the attempt of the
European family of nations to intervene in its political affairs, it has been
chary about intruding into their circle. ( ... ) Without going into further
explanation on the subject, the President apprehends that the course you
suggest might lead to complications in European politics contrary to the
settled policy of this government." 111
The second constant was that the Swiss cause should never appear as a
priority of the American administration. The slowness which that
administration demonstrated on the issue of the establishment of diplomatic
relations bears witness to this fact. Despite several requests by Mann, the
first of which dates from August 1849, it was necessary to await the latter's
trip to Washington in June 1850, in order to get these particular international
negotiations moving. The Whig government of Taylor however only
consented to a provisional accreditation permitting the negotiation of a
treaty. The question of a stable representation in Switzerland was
reexamined after the coup d'etat of December 2nd , 1851 in France. Mann's
requests were on that occasion relayed by a resolution of Richard Brodhead
(Pennsylvania), deposed and adopted in February 1852 in the Senate and
which was favorably endorsed by Secretary of State Webster. 112
Nonetheless, it was necessary to await the end of January 1853 so that the
new Secretary of State Everett could request the necessary funds from the
110

NA RG 59 / M77 (Special missions, Dudley Mann), instructions of Clayton to Mann,
June 15'\ 1850.
111

NA RG 59 / M77 (Diplomatic instructions, Switzerland), instructions of the DS (Marcy)
to Fay, January 2nd , 1857.
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NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), reports from
Mann to the DS (Webster), December 10th and 15th , 1851; NA RG 59 / M 179
(Miscellaneous letters of the DS), letter of Senator Richard Brodhead to the DS (Webster),
December 20 th , 1851; NA RG 59 / M 40 (Domestic letters), letter from the DS (Webster) to
Senator Richard Brodhead, January 31st, 1852; The Congressional Globe, February 1852,
pp. 469-470; NA RG46 / Senate 32A-E4 (Committee on Foreign Relations), DS (Webster)
to Mason (Chairman Comm Foreign Affairs), March 4th , 1852.
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House of Representatives. On February 19th , the latter voted in favor of the
credit by a unanimous vote less one. 113 In June 1853, Theodore S. Fay
finally took office in Berne, with the title of American resident minister.
Four years had passed since Mann's initial request to fund the position.
The third constant was the desire to obtain the signature on a treaty of
commerce and friendship. In this sphere, the degree of motivation of the
different actors on the stage of state diverged. On October 111\ 1849 Mann
mentioned for the first time a mission for political and commercial purposes
which would cover Switzerland, Tuscany and Greece. Clayton's response,
which did not arrive until February l 5\ 1850, announced a study of the
commercial advisability of the mission: "The question of sending a special
mission to Tuscany, Switzerland and Greece, is still under consideration.
Should it appear to the President's judgment, after further reflection, that a
special agent to those countries, would be likely essentially to advance our
commercial interests, the services you have already rendered on several
occasions, will undoubtedly recommend you for the trust. " 114 Despite new
appeals in February and April, Mann still did not receive the green light. It
was only at the time of his lightning trip to Washington, in January, that he
managed to convince Clayton and Taylor. The mission however would be
limited to the conclusion of a treaty with Switzerland, whose objective
seemed above all commercial: "At this period when the reactionary
movement of continental Europe seems to threaten the obliteration of liberal
political institutions, we owe it to the character of our own free government,
as well as to the commercial interests of our country to strengthen, by all
the means at our disposal, the ties which bind us to the Swiss confederation,
which like our own happy land is the home of the free (. .. ) The importance
of the preservation of the nationality of Switzerland to the United States in a
commercial view cannot be mistaken( ... ) Were the confederation even now
to enter the Deutscher Zollverein, the heavy duties amounting to $3.35 per
ct. on tobacco, now levied by that Union would add to the oppression of the
regie, and enormous duties in other countries already so deeply affecting
that American staple." 115
Upon the death of Taylor, the new President Fillmore appointed Webster
to the Department of State. Linked to the merchant milieux, the latter was
113
NA RG 59 / Reports of the Secretary of State to the President and Congress 1790-1906
(Report book, vol. 6, p. 482), DS (Everett) to Henry Bayly, chairman of the Committee on
foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, January 25'\ 1853; MEIER, op. cit., pp. 4144.
114
NA RG 59 / M77 (Special missions, Dudley Mann), instructions of the DS (Clayton) to
Mann, February 1st , 1850.
115
NA RG 59 / M77 (Special missions, Dudley Mann), instructions of the DS (Clayton) to
Mann, June 15'\ I 850.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2006

41

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 42 [2006], No. 3, Art. 2
Review
[November

44

aware of the importance of commercial relations with Switzerland. Upon the
reception of the first draft of the treaty, in January 1851, Webster therefore
sought to convince the President of the necessity of a rapid ratification
without amendment by the Senate: "I shall be at any time ready to confer
with you on the subject of this Convention, and with the other heads of the
Department, if you should think proper . It is desirable to avoid
recommending any amendments to the Senate unless there be some clear
necessity for such course: and as the session is fast running out, it may be
well to send in the treaty soon. " 116 President Fillmore however was not of
the same opinion. Not sensitive to the commercial issues of the treaty, he
accorded priority to considerations of domestic policy-States' rights in the
matter of inheritance and the right of establishment of the Jewish
population. In his message to the Senate, he thus proposed two amendments
which were approved by unanimous vote less one.
Between the modification of the treaty in the Senate, March 7'n, 1851, and
the dispatch of new instructions to Mann, on September 25th , nearly seven
months elapsed, which can only be explained by a certain lack of interest on
the part of the Fillmore administration. The end of this period of American
diplomatic lethargy was perhaps linked to the worrisome evolution of the
commercial situation in Europe. In September 1851, the States of the
"Steuerverein" (Hanover , Oldenburg, Braunschweig and SchaumburgLippe) yielded to the pressure of Prussia and entered the Zollverein. The
German strategy of Mann was thus given a pounding. In addition , the
situation of latent commercial war between Switzerland and the Zollverein
only caused to grow the threat of Prussian intervention in Switzerland. To
such a point that English diplomacy intervened in Switzerland and in
Germany in order to calm things down. 117 In May 1852, a report from the
British ambassador in Berne confirmed the commercial motivations of the
American authorities: "As far as I can ascertain from Mr. Mann, the
principal advantage which his government anticipates from the treaty is the
prevention of any exclusive commercial alliance between Switzerland and

116
Cited in MILLER, HUNTER, op. cit., p. 879; the attitude of Webster is analyzed in
several other works; MEIER, op. cit., pp. 36-37; SCHAPPES , op. cit., pp. 315-324 ;
SHEWMAKER,op. cit., pp. 157-161; the fact that he did not oppose the discriminatory
clause on the Jews is often attributed to the defense of commercial interests and the doctrine
of States' Rights.
117
Between July and October 1851, numerous reports of the British ambassador in Berne
make mention of diplomatic steps designed to resolve the commercial conflict between
Switzerland and the Zollverein; PRO FO 100 I 69 (1851), reports of Christie to the FO
(Palmerston)/2 .8. 1851 /25.8.1851 /3.9 .1851 / 16.9.1851 / 15.10.1851
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the neighboring States, or the formation of a Zollverein of which this
country would become a member." 118
The second version of the treaty with Switzerland returned to Washington
in July 1852, after the coup d'etat of Napoleon; Switzerland, which
thereupon became the last liberal bastion of Europe, was under the threat of
the intervention of France and Austria. The new Secretary of State Everett
however did not transmit it to the President until November 23 rd, 1852,
without a proposal for amendment. On February 3rd, 1853, Fillmore
concurred with this point of view in his message to the Senate. This last
institution however did not seem to be in a hurry to conclude this particular
business. Between March 9th , the date of its entry on the Senate's agenda,
and April 5 th , the treaty was discussed on six separate occasions. Because of
successive reports, however, the discussion was not concluded during the
session. 119 It was necessary to wait until December 20 1\ 1853 for the treaty
to be reactivated by the Senate. On January 3r\ 1854, Secretary of State
Marcy asked the president of the Committee on Foreign Relations to
activate the discussion in order to be able to transmit the treaty to the Swiss
Chambers. 120 It should be noted that the Austrian threat was then at its
height and that Mann was appointed to the position of assistant to the
Secretary of State (April 1853). It was however necessary to wait until May
10th , 1854 so that true discussion of the matter could take place in the
Senate, upon the request of Senator Clayton. Because of discussions linked
to a new amendment on inheritance, the second version of the treaty was
only approved May 29 th , 1854. 121 It reached Fay by June 81\ in other words
two years after his second transatlantic crossing.
The course of the treaty through the Halls of Congress permits us to draw
two intermediate conclusions. Whereas Mann accorded both a great political
and a great commercial value to the signature of the treaty, as a symbolic
gesture of the United States towards its "sister Republic," this latter
dimension seemed much less meaningful to Washington. To be sure, the
different Secretaries of State sought on several occasions to give fresh
impetus in order to shake the Senate out of its immobility, but at no time did
they put true pressure on that body. Moreover, no source cites the political
118

PRO FO 100 / 72 (1852), report of Buchanan to the FO (Malmesbury), May 12'\ 1852.
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Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States, vol. IX,
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necessity of rapidly reaching a conclusion in order to help the last liberal
bastion of Europe. The commercial interests, and in particular those of the
tobacco lobby, therefore appear to have been the principal motor propelling
the conclusion of the treaty. Considerations of domestic policy, to which the
Senate accorded greater importance than the administration, did however
slow down the process of ratification.

The Question of the Establishment of American Jews in Switzerland:
Federalist Impediments to the Conclusion of a Treaty

The first version of the treaty signed in 1850 contains the following
clause at the end of article I consecrating the reciprocal freedom of
establishment of the citizens of the two countries: "Given the tenor of the
federal Constitution of Switzerland, Christians alone may benefit from the
present article, in Swiss cantons, which does not prevent these cantons from
allowing citizens of the United States professing other religious beliefs to
enjoy it. " 122 In fact, this article excluded American Jewish citizens from
establishment in certain Swiss cantons. This religious discrimination, which
is worthy of medieval anti-Semitic practices, surprises us in an agreement
concluded in the middle of the nineteenth century, between two States
defining themselves as the champions of liberalism. In order to understand
it, it is necessary to say a few words on the subject of anti-Semitism in
Switzerland during this era.
Anti-Semitism in Switzerland: Deeply Rooted Prejudices
As in the majority of European countries, the process of emancipation of
the Swiss Jewish population, victimized by the worst discrimination in the
Middle Ages, was long and difficult. 123 In 1653 / 57, the federal Diet forced
the Jews already present in Swiss territory to settle exclusively in the region
of Baden. From this decree were born the two communes-ghettos of
Lengnau and Endingen which, in 1776, counted 108 families with 553
persons. Whereas the revolutionary periods of the Helvetic Republic and the
122
Feuille federate suisse, 1855 , vol. 2, "Traite conclu entre la Confederation suisse et !es
Etats-Unis de I' Amerique du Nord," pp. 20-21.
123
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Mediation marked an extension of the rights of the Jewish population,
thanks to the influence exerted by France, the Restoration was characterized
by a return to very discriminatory practices. In the matter of establishment,
the great majority of the cantons applied a very restrictive policy, going to
the extreme of forbidding residence. Foreign Jews were not welcomed with
any more eagerness. Invoking the danger of an influx of Alsatian Jews, who
at that time constituted an important community (40,000 persons), the
Confederation demanded that the treaty on establishment, signed in 1827
with France, exclude the Jewish population from the freedom of
establishment. After the advent of Louis-Philippe to power, in 1830, the
French government nonetheless tried to soften the restrictive policy of the
Swiss cantons. 124 Following the Wahl affair, which erupted in 1835, France
even imposed a blockade of several months on the canton Basel-Campagne.
In 1839, a directive from the same canton, which hindered the activity of
French Jewish cattle merchants, gave rise to a new controversy.
It was in this climate of tension that was worked out the elaboration of the
Constitution of 1848. The discussions concerning articles 41 (freedom of
establishment) and 44 (freedom of religion) permit the historian to measure
the strength of the anti-Semitic prejudices, which were more powerful than
the liberal principles. By virtue of article 4, which stipulates that "All the
Swiss are equal before the law," article 41 should have accorded the
freedom of establishment to all the Confederates, whether they were Jewish
or Christians. At the heart of the commission charged with elaborating the
constitution, this eventuality provoked violent reactions, like that of future
Zurich federal councilor Furrer: "In much legislation the admission of
Israelites is either positively forbidden or at least subordinated to the formal
consent of the interested communes. In a number of cantons it would be
considered as a scourge that the freedom of establishment should be also
extended to this class and that the communes could then be legally
constrained to accord a domicile to the Israelites as to other Swiss citizens.
The Israelites have exploited and exhausted through their usury to such an
extent the Zurich district of Regensberg in the neighborhood of the Jewish
communes of Endingen and Lengnau that the legislation must contain
rigorous measures against such abuses. " 125 As future Federal Councilor
Frey-Herose remarked, the cantons having a common border with France
were among the most ferocious opponents of a liberal policy: "Yet the
opposition has proven to be very strong, notably on the part of the border
cantons. They have declared that even if something could be done for the
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Jews of Endingen and Lengnau, that would have very bad repercussions on
the situation of the French Jews . It was therefore impossible for certain
cantons to accept a liberal disposition on this subject, because there had
existed for a long time with France a treaty on establishment , of which the
Jews of France could avail themselves in order to claim for themselves the
completely advantageous benefits assured to Swiss Jews . (. .. ) Moreover I
must not conceal from you the fact (. ..) that several members of the
commission have spoken of the Jews in very unflattering terms. It was
learned in fact that in diverse cantons they were behaving in a very
unsatisfactory manner, to such an extent that in certain places people had
gone so far as to expel them rather than to emancipate them. It even seems
probable that there will soon be here and there some expulsions. " 126 The
deliberations of the Diet ratified the idea of according the freedom of
establishment only to Swiss citizens, and therefore foreigners , of the
Christian faith (article 41). It was the same for freedom of religion (article
44).
The Constitution of 1848 therefore left to the cantons the competence to
legislate on the matter of the freedom of establishment for Swiss citizens or
foreigners of non-Christian faiths. It could be imagined that by virtue of the
victories of the liberal movement of the 30s and 40s, the majority of the
cantons would have ratified the emancipation of their Jewish residents. That
was far from being the case. Realized in 1858 by the Federal Council , an
investigation showed that only two cantons (Geneva and Vaud) accorded at
that time full equality, de jure and de facto, to their Jewish populations.
Numerous cantons, in particular those at the center and in the east of the
country, maintained significant economic and political policies of
discrimination , which went as far as the pure and simple prohibition of the
freedom of establishment. By comparison with the rest of Europe,
Switzerland therefore lagged behind in the matter of emancipation. In 1873,
it was the only country of western Europe, in company with the Catholic
bastions of Spain and Portugal, to still discriminate against the Jewish
religion .127 This virulent anti-Semitism resulted in a very small Jewish
population on Swiss soil. To the three hundred households grouped in the
two communes-ghettos of Aargau, can be added a mere two hundred Jewish
families disseminated throughout the other cantons, which represents about
3,200 persons in all of Switzerland, or 0.1 % of the total Swiss population. 128
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The American Authorities Confronted with the Discrimination against their
Jewish Nationals: From Refusal to tacit Consent

When it reached the American authorities, in December 1850, the first
version of the treaty therefore contained a clause which positively excluded
American Jews from certain privileges accorded to Christians. In his report,
the agent Dudley Mann nonetheless tended to minimize the scope of this
clause: "Religious disqualification to citizenship does not extend to all the
cantons of Switzerland. This intolerance is confined only to a portion of
them, while each has the right to abrogate it whenever it thinks proper. Any
canton may permit an Israelite to become a citizen upon the same conditions
as a Christian; and consequently, one hailing from the United States, to
establish himself and trade as though he were a native-a privilege which I
am assured will never be denied. In enlightened States the spirit of
persecution against man's conscience is fast disappearing, and nowhere
with more rapidity than in this republic. It was more than thirty years, if I
rightly remember, after the adoption of our constitution, before the
Israelites were fully affranchised in Maryland. So long a term will not have
elapsed under the new system of Switzerland until every canton is
religiously free, as is clearly indicated in all that transpires. " 129 Why did
Mann report on Switzerland in a manner so favorable? Did he want to
deceive the authorities in Washington, as certain members of the Jewish
community reproached him? Was he himself unenthusiastic about defending
the rights of the Jewish population? It is more probable that, swept away by
his liberal enthusiasm regarding the new federal State, as well as by his
economic interest in the conclusion of a treaty, Mann allowed himself to be
influenced by the arguments of the Federal Council, which he restated
without critical distance: "Indeed, the existing remnant of the text is
maintained more as a precautionary measure to the material well-being of
the cantons concerned, than as a demonstration against certain religious
tenets. It is considered a safe-guard against the immense itinerant
population of Alsace. " 130 Did he receive false assurance from the Swiss
government concerning a liberal attitude in favor of the freedom of
establishment for American Jewish citizens, as some would claim later on in
order to excuse the attitude of the American authorities? Because of the
secret character of the negotiations, it is not possible to resolve the issue.
Interrogated on this subject in 1859, the Swiss negotiator Frey-Herose
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categorically denied having given any guarantee to the American
negotiator. 131
First of all, the Webster-Fillmore duo found no fault with the
discriminatory clause inserted by Mann in the treaty. It is therefore quite
probable that without the violent reaction of the American Jewish
community, alerted by the debate devoted to the treaty in Switzerland, the
President would not have proposed any amendments on this subject.
Between mid-January 1851 and March 7t\ 1851, the date of the debate in
the Senate, the Jewish American lobby, which then represented about
100,000 citizens, led a first campaign against the Swiss-American
agreement. The charge was sounded by the Jewish review "The Asmonean"
which called for a struggle against the treaty . 132 Several letters were
addressed to the Department of State in order to ask it to refuse a form of
discrimination judged to be unconstitutional. It was quite particularly feared
that a precedent would be created which other European States could use in
order to expel the American Jewish merchants. 133 In his message of
February 13th , 1851, Fillmore took into account the pressures and proposed
to amend the treaty in these terms: "It appears from this that Christians
alone are, in some of the Swiss cantons, entitled to the enjoyment of
privileges guaranteed by the first article, although the cantons themselves
are not prohibited from extending the same privileges to the citizens of the
United States of other religious persuasions. It is quite certain that neither
by law, nor by treaty, nor by any other official proceeding is it competent
for the Government of the United States to establish any distinction between
its citizens founded on differences in religious beliefs. Any benefit or
privilege conferred by law or treaty on one must be common to all, and we
are not at liberty, on a question of such vital interest and plain
constitutional duty, to consider whether the particular case is one in which
substantial inconvenience or injustice might ensue. It is enough that an
inequality would be sanctioned hostile to the institutions of the United States
131
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and inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws. " 134 In the perspective of
the debate in the Senate, the communities of New York and Cincinnati
addressed two memos, which the Whig Senators Henry Clay and Salmon
Chase accepted to defend. 135 On March 7th , 1851, the discriminatory clause
was stricken from the agreement by the Senate.
At the same time when Mann received the new version of the treaty, in
November 1851, Swiss anti-Semitism was the talk of the international news .
On July 2 nd , 1851, yielding to the pressure of local merchants, the authorities
of Basel-City decided to expel a series of Alsatian Jewish merchants
established for a long time in their territory. On November 17th , 1851, the
canton of Basel-Campagne voted for a law forbidding the right of
establishment of all Jews, whether they were Swiss or foreign. The few Jews
up until then tolerated were expelled. On January 1st, 1852, the American
consul in Basel noted that certain American citizens had been refused the
right of establishment in certain cantons because of their religious practice
of Judaism. 136 After having tried to resolve the matter in an amicable
manner, the French government sent a first note of protest , dated October
27 th , 1851. On December 161\ 1851, or after the coup d'etat of Napoleon
Bonaparte, a second note sent a veritable ultimatum to the Swiss
government, along with the threat to expel Swiss nationals from Basel from
French territory. 137 This step was supported by the Jewish community, and
in particular by the banker Rothschild who pushed the French government
into an intransigent attitude. 138 In a note of January 20 1\ 1852, the Federal
Council defended the policy of the cantons of Basel, which did not
contravene the treaty of 1827 and which was legitimized by anti-Semitic
prejudices: "The legislation of diverse cantons which refuses or makes
difficult the freedom of establishment for Jews in general, has not been
inspired by ideas of intolerance or religious persecution , but rather dictated
by numerous and bitter experiences of the manner in which these people
ordinarily conduct their businesses and by how they have essentially
134
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impoverished entire countries. " 139 In order to avoid having the affair
exacerbate diplomatic tensions with France, the Swiss government
convinced the two Basels to suspend the execution of their measures. The
latter were finally applied during the summer of 1852, during the period of
the negotiation of the second version of the treaty with the United States. A
second debate on the subject of the Swiss-American treaty was then begun
in the Jewish American press. 140
Upon reopening negotiations, Mann therefore became aware of the
difficulty of reaching an agreement on the subject of the freedom of
establishment for American Jews in Switzerland: "It is not easy of
arrangement solely on account of the Constitutional difficulty relative to the
Israelites. The different Cantons will perhaps have to be consulted before a
decision is made by the Executive Department (... )" 141 Contrary to the
government of the United States, the Federal Council did not benefit from a
constitutional clause permitting it to impose provisions contrary to the laws
of the States, for the purpose of treaty making ("Treaty Making Power").
Convinced of the great importance of the agreement, Mann nonetheless did
attempt to mollify the policy of the Swiss government. The latter proved to
be inflexible. While respect for the Swiss Constitution was invoked in
dealing with the American negotiator, other considerations explain this
refusal. To grant the freedom of establishment to the American Jews would
be to grant the privilege to all the Jews of all the States having concluded a
treaty with Switzerland. That would be an open door to the Jews of Alsace,
who were so dreaded. Moreover, the negotiators were themselves convinced
of the necessity to "protect" themselves against a possible invasion of
American Jews: "Although the number of Swiss who emigrate to the United
States is and will be for a long time much more considerable than that of the
citizens of those same States who will come to settle in Switzerland, the
latter country is not less interested than the former in extending its reserves,
in order to protect itself. If the United States must protect itself against the
139
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quantity of immigrants, it is particularly the quality of the new arrivals that
Switzerland must take into consideration, not only the Israelites, but other
exploiters. We must not dissimulate it; this federal republic, which is
growing every day, whose eyes are fixed upon the entire world, which now
makes an expedition to Japan in the interest of its commerce, after having
made war on Mexico in order to push back the limits of its territory, this
vast, active and powerful Confederation wants to have influence
everywhere, have its citizens, its businesses, its ships, its factories, its flag in
every part of the globe, in the interest of its foreign policy and its worldwide
influence, as well as in that of its agriculture, its industry, its commerce and
its navigation. Therefore, if the ratifications can be exchanged, we must
expect to see arrive soon in Switzerland American citizens, first of all
probably in a quite small number, but enterprising, rich or disposing of
immense capital and wanting to found great businesses which will perhaps
cause dreadful competition for Swiss labor and will serve as a lever for
other enterprises of more than one sort. It is consequently prudent not to
disarm, in order to be able to act as the various circumstances and
situations, which cannot be foreseen, will require it. " 142 Colored by a certain
anti-Americanism, these proposals sharply contrast with the speeches of
friendship and fraternity made in public Swiss opinion. Because of the
political and economic importance of a treaty with the United States, the
Federal Council was however convinced of the necessity of finding a
solution.
The negotiators mentioned first of all the possibility of suppressing the
articles devoted to establishment, but quickly renounced this option:
"Deprived of the first five articles, consecrating the proposed reciprocal
freedom of establishment, the treaty would lose the stipulations which, with
those concerning the extradition of criminals, constitute its moral and even
political part, which essentially give it the character of a treaty of
friendship, the part , in a word, which gives a great international importance
to this agreement between the two federal republics. " 143 A subterfuge was
thus found to forbid the establishment of American Jews without explicitly
discriminating against them in the text of the treaty. The new formulation of
article 1, which deals with the freedom of establishment, in fact reserves the
constitutional and legal stipulations of the two countries: ''The citizens of
the United States and the citizens of Switzerland are admitted and treated
equally in the two countries, when that admission and that treatment have
nothing contrary to the constitutional or legal provisions, both at the federal
142
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and the state and the cantonal level, of the contractual parties." The
exclusion of the American Jews remained , but it was now concealed in a
general provision of a federalist character which could only be welcomed by
the defenders of the doctrine of "States' rights." In a report on the
negotiations, Mann however revealed himself to be very skeptical
concerning the acceptability of the new draft of the treaty by the American
authorities. 144 The constitutionality of the treaty remained problematic on
the other side of the Atlantic.
Against all expectations, the new Secretary of State Everett accepted the
propositions of the Federal Council, as well as President Fillmore, whose
message of February 3rd , 1853 proposed no amendment. The attitude of the
American government should not be ascribed to ignorance, since the Jewish
community addressed to it several requests for information on the subject of
the treaty, which had a value of warning. 145 The decision of the American
government was all the more surprising in that it coincided with the
launching of an important movement of opinion , whose goal was to assure
the freedom of worship to American citizens residing abroad . On December
13t\ 1852, a resolution was deposed in the House of Representatives: "Be it
resolved , that the representatives of this Government at foreign courts be
instructed to urge such amendments of all existing treaties between the
United States and the other powers of the world as will secure the same
liberty of religious worship to all American citizens residing under foreign
flags which is guaranteed to all citizens of every nation of the whole world
who reside under the flag of our Union. Resolved, that all commissions
hereafter appointed to negotiate treaties shall consider themselves
instructed to secure if possible in all of their treaties. " 146 The principal
objective of the movement, which sent numerous petitions to the Senate,
was to facilitate the establishment of Protestant merchants in certain
Catholic countries rarely liberal in the matter of freedom of religion. In
March 1854, the Jewish community joined the movement and addressed its
own petitions: about 1150 signatures were collected, especially in Cincinnati
(300) and New York (185). 147 On April 19th , 1854, in other words a month
before the acceptance of the treaty, they were presented to the Senate by
144
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Senator Cass. On January 5th , 1855, the movement culminated in the
adoption of a resolution similar to that deposed in 1852.
In June 1853, the Jewish community undertook a new measure, which
was motivated by the expulsion of an American Jewish citizen residing in a
Swiss city: "A citizen of this State, who resided for the last two years at

Chaux-de-Fonds Switzerland for the transaction of his firm in this city, has
been notified by the municipal authorities that being a Jew he could not any
longer remain there. " 148 To be sure , following the pressures of minister
Fay, 149 who convinced the Federal Council to intervene with the local
authorities , the latter did accept, in February 1854, to tolerate Gootman. The
latter was finally expelled from Chaux-de-Fonds in 1857, which prevented
him from experiencing the anti-Semitic riot which erupted there in 1861.
The expulsion of 1853 confronted the American authorities with the reality
of Swiss anti-Semitism. Contrary to the hopes of Mann, the intolerance did
not involve just the Jews of Alsace, but also the American citizens.
Throughout 1854, the Jewish community continued to fight against the
treaty concluded with Switzerland. In March , a letter was notably addressed
to Secretary of State Marcy. 150 In May, new press articles demanded the
refusal of the treaty . 151 That did not prevent the Senate from ratifying it
unanimously, May 29 1\ 1854.
Certain people have claimed that at the moment of voting, the Senators
were not aware of the scope of the new first article. Did Secretary of State
Marcy and his assistant Mann, who could not have been ignorant of the
facts, succeed in deceiving the entire body of the Senate? That seems very
improbable, all the more so in that the champion of religious liberties,
Senator Cass, had been put on guard by the Jewish community. On April
13th , 1854, the latter responded to the appeal in these terms: "The invidious
distinction contained in the treaty with Switzerland between American
citizens granting rights to Christians which are withheld from Jews was not
ratified by the Senate; such a principle will never receive the sanction of
this body. The provision was struck out and the treaty was sent back to
procure the assent of the Swiss Government to the change. I understand that
148

NA RG 59 / M 179 (Miscellaneous letters of the DS), Joseph Beckel to the DS (Marcy) ,
June 27'\ 1853.
149

Message from the President of the United States, transmitting information relative to
discriminations in Switzerland against citizens of the United States of the Hebrew
Persuasion, April 261\ 1860. Printed as House Executive Document 17, 35th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1902, pp. 2-6.
150

NA RG 59 / M 179 (Miscellaneous letters of the DS), Jakob Ezechiel to the DS (Marcy),
March 15th , 1854.

Published
byop.
BYU
2006
STROOCK,
cit.,ScholarsArchive,
pp. 15-16.

151

53

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 42 [2006], No. 3, Art. 2

56

Review

[November

the assent has been given, but there is some other point, which will again
require the action of the Senate. " 152 Evidently, the Senators decided to
content themselves with the suppression of the clause explicitly
discriminating against Jewish American citizens and to consider the new
version to be in conformity with the Constitution. This interpretation, which
is hardly compatible with the first message of Fillmore, permitted the
American government to satisfy the intransigence of the Swiss authorities
and to thus achieve the ratification of the treaty .
In 1857, at the moment when the Jewish community was launching the
question of the constitutionality of the treaty, the Democratic administration
insisted on the following interpretation: "In its present form altho' it may
not remove some difficulties which existed at the time of its adoption with
reference to those who profess the lsraelitish faith, yet I do not see that it
discriminates against this class of our citizens in any mode whatever.
Undoubtedly in some portions of the Confederation the local laws are less
liberal to Israelites than to others, and this is deeply to be regretted; but the
Government of the United States has no control of course over the
legislation of a foreign state and can only employ its influence and good
offices to relieve the difficulties which such legislation may impose in any
given case. " 153 It should be noted that part of the Jewish community,
sensitive to the doctrine of "States' rights," adhered to this interpretation. 154
This attitude is to be linked to the polemics which were then raging on the
subject of the imprisonment of black foreign sailors by certain slave States
of the South. The latter, which forbade their territory to free colored men,
refused to apply the treaties on freedom of establishment concluded with
other States. 155 The partisans of the doctrine of "States' rights" could not
therefore refuse to the Swiss cantons what they required of their own central
government: respect for their legislation on the subject of freedom of
establishment.
152

The Charleston Daily Courier , October 14m, 1857, "The Treaty with Switzerland and the
Jews ," mentions a letter from Cass to a member of the Jewish community .
153
NA RG 59 / M40 (Domestic letters of the Department) , DS (Appleton) to Herzberg ,
August 13m, 1857, cf. also DS to Einhorn , August 13m,1857; DS to Limberger , September
4m, 1857.
154

SCHAPPES , op. cit., note 5, p. 649; the author cites two Jewish personalities who
supported the interpretation of the government in the name of States' rights, one already in
1851; in 1857, the principal voice of this tendency expressed himself under the pseudonym
"A Jew" ; he maintained a long correspondence with J.N.C. in the Charleston Daily Courier ,
August 25m,29m, 31st / September 3rd , 4m, 14'\ 17m,1857.
155

During the presidency of Tyler (1841-1845), several cases of imprisonment of foreign
black sailors provoked violent debates between the central administration and the slave
States; WASHBURN , op. cit., pp. 280-282.
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The Doctrine of "States' Rights" and the Question of the Inheritance of
Real Estate

While the doctrine of States' rights facilitated the acceptance of Swiss
demands in the matter of establishment, it posed great problems in the
dossier of the inheritance of real estate by Swiss nationals. The secessionist
tendencies of the Southern States having the wind in their sails, the central
administration and the Senate sought to avoid clashing with them by forcing
them to liberalize access to real estate property.
The American Opposition to a Liberalization of Access to Land
When it arrived in Washington, in December 1850, the first version of the
Swiss-American treaty negotiated by Mann contained some very liberal
provisions in favor of Swiss citizens, which went further than the agreement
concluded in 1847. By invoking the precedent of the treaty signed with New
Granada, in 1846, Mann granted an article 5 which suppressed all
distinction between movable property and permanent real estate in the
modalities of inheritance. Fillmore's reaction came quickly: "I have read
and herewith return the treaty with Mr. Mann's explanation. 1 believe our
trade with that country is small, consisting mostly in watches and silks from
them, and a few exports from us. But there is some emigration from that
country to this; and it seems to me that a treaty stipulation that they may
become landholders, and inherit, regardless of residence or citizenship is
rather unusual, and may be deemed an infringement upon the rights of the
states, which usually regulate the mode of transfer and tenure of real estate
within their respective borders. " 156 In his message to the Senate, Fillmore
therefore proposed to amend articles 1 and 5, considering that the liberties
granted to Swiss citizens surpassed the "Treaty Making Power" of the
central authorities: "These articles appear to contain provisions quite
objectionable, if, indeed, they can be considered as properly embraced in
the treaty-making power (. .. ) It is well known that according to the
Constitution of the United States a citizen of one State may hold lands in
any other State; and States have, sometimes by general, sometimes by
special laws, removed the disabilities attaching to foreigners not
naturalized in regard to the holding of land. But this is not supposed to be a
power properly to be exercised by the President and Senate in concluding
and ratifying a treaty with a foreign state. The authority naturally belongs
to the State within whose limits the land lies." 157
156
157

Cited in MILLER , HUNTER, op. cit., pp. 878-879.
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The interpretation of President Fillmore, which contradicted a long
tradition of encroachment by the central power upon the laws of the States
in matters of inheritance, can be explained in several manners. First of all,
the treaty with Switzerland goes very far in the granted privileges, since it
assures every Swiss citizen of the possibility of possessing land and of
inheriting it in American territory. Well, because of heavy Swiss
immigration to the United States, the consequences of these provisions were
on an altogether different scale from those of the treaty with New Grenada.
The Consul of Switzerland in New York, De Luze, was himself convinced
that they could not be accepted by the Senate. 158 Secondly, the political
context was hardly favorable to the partisans of the "Treaty Making Power."
With the exacerbation of the tensions between the North and the South tariffs policy, bank policy, slavery, town and country planning--, which
translated into an increase of secessionist desires, the central administration
in Washington had more and more scruples about encroaching upon the
sovereignty of the States. At the end of 1850, at the moment when the
discussion of the treaty began, the domestic political situation was
particularly explosive, as the Neue Zurcher Zeitung bears witness: "The next
Congress will once again have to deal with the question of slavery. The
enemies of the Union in the South are beginning to become very bold; in
South Carolina they are speaking quite openly about plans for secession
and the establishment of a new Republic. Passionate leaders control the
masses, and should the cries for secession in Georgia, Mississippi and
Alabama become as loud as in Carolina, an open insurrection for secession
could follow. The latter scenario has however at present no probability." 159
In this context of tensions, President Fillmore adopted a policy of
moderation. He emerged as one of the principal architects of the
Compromise of 1850, which attenuated for a while the "sectionalist"
confrontations, before the latter ultimately resulted in the Civil War (18611865).
The version of the treaty approved by the Senate thus constituted a
regression in comparison with the agreement of 1847; in fact, it abolished
the delay of three years granted to realize the sale of inherited real estate.
The Federal Council therefore could not be satisfied with it. In the course of
the second negotiation, the Swiss government came back to the existing
agreement, while attempting to improve it on two points: lengthening the
delay for sale of property from three to six years and obtaining the right for
Swiss consuls to administrate the inherited estates instead of American

158

AF E21 / 24600, the Consul of Switzerland in New York, L.P. de Luze, to the Federal
Council, February 14'\ 1851; cited in Documents diplomatiques suisses, op.cit., pp. 217-222.
159

Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Nr. 316, November 12th , 1850, "Ausland."
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officials . Mann however refused to integrate these two demands. 160 The
second version of the treaty, which was accepted by Fillmore, was therefore
very similar to the agreement of 1847. But against every expectation, the
partisans of the doctrine of States ' rights were not content with it. On May
10th , 1854, Senator Pettit deposed a proposition of amendment which
suppressed the delay of sale granted to Swiss heirs. 16 1 The latter was
accepted by 18 votes against 11. The defenders of States' rights were led by
the representatives of the secessionist states of Carolina , Georgia and
Alabama , where the right to possess land was very restrictive. They were
supported by the States having heavy Swiss immigration, several of which
were however liberal on this issue (California, Wisconsin , New York). The
defeated camp was constituted by representatives of States having a liberal
tradition and by senators interested in the cultivation of tobacco. The
number of participants in the vote however not being sufficient , the Senate
was constrained to deal once again with the Swiss dossier. On May 29th ,
1854, a proposition for compromise was proposed by James Mason, Senator
from Virginia and the President of the "Committee on Foreign Relations":
the delay of three years was thus replaced by a delay conforming to the laws
of each state. The transaction was unanimously accepted.

The Swiss Authorities Yield: the Treaty with the United States is indeed
worth a Compromise on the Issue of Inheritance
Although the American authorities tried to minimize the real scope of the
amendment, the new draft of article 5 was far from satisfactory for the Swiss
authorities: the latter represented in fact a retrogression in comparison with
the agreement of 1847. Before making its decision, the Federal Council
asked the American State Department to proceed to an investigation on the
policies of the different American States on the matter of real estate. 162 The
furnished information showed that if 11 States granted the same rights to
foreigners as to their own citizens, 8 prohibited any acquisition of land
wealth, 4 limited land ownership to those who had already applied for
citizenship and 8 imposed more or less significant restrictions. Upon seeing
these results, the Federal Council decided to remain satisfied with the new
version of article 5: on the one hand, it considered that the majority of the
160

NA RGI 1 / Ml247 (Treaty files , no 353 , roll 24) , note from the Federal Council to the
negotiator A. Dudley Mann , July 5'\ 1852; Feuille fed erate suisse, 1855, vol. 2, "Traite
conclu entre la Conf ederation suisse et Jes Etats-Uni s de I' Amerique du Nord ," pp . 43-46.
161
Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States, vol. IX,
6. 12. 1852- 3.3 .1855, Washington , 1887, pp . 25- 26; a nominal list of the voters is figured .
162
Feuille f ederale suisse, 1855, vol. 2, "Traite conclu entre la Confederation suisse et Jes
Etats-Unis de I' Amerique du Nord ," pp . 48-5 3.
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American States toward which the Swiss were migrating practiced a liberal
policy; on the other, it was convinced that a refusal of article 5 would lead to
a burial of the treaty by the United States; finally, the prolongation of the
agreement of 1847, which concluded in 1859, was highly unlikely.
At the heart of the Swiss Federal Chambers, article 5 was nonetheless
attacked: "The negotiations on the subject of article V, the most important
of all, have had the least favorable result. Twice this article has been
changed by the Senate of the United States, and always in a direction more
unfavorable for Switzerland (... ) This particular version destroys the
guarantees given by the treaty of May 18'", 1847 to Swiss heirs; the latter
were once again abandoned to the whims of the different States which
would be able to reduce as they wished the delay of sale and make it
impossible for those Swiss heirs to enter into possession of a real estate
inheritance. You understand, Gentlemen, the importance of this provision in
the presence of the every growing emigration towards the United States. " 163
Several provisions referring to establishment and to trade were also
criticized, but the acceptance of the treaty was not questioned: "Your
commission nonetheless proposes the ratification of the treaty such as it is,
presented to you, because it still offers real advantages, and a rupture of the
negotiations which have lasted 5 years would make an excessively bad
impression. The interest which must lead the oldest Republic of the old
world to unite with its young sister in the new world is increased even more
by the present political conjunction of circumstances. " 164
Whereas the American authorities yielded on the matter of the
establishment of the Jews, the Swiss authorities made concessions on the
inheritance of real estate. They likewise made concessions in the area of
extradition, because the American views are fully taken into account in
articles 13 to 17 of the treaty. The latter correspond to the treaty of 1846
amended by the Senate, whose ratification had been abandoned . Switzerland
renounced for the first time its demand not to put its own nationals into the
hands of the justice of the contractual country. Mann considered this
provision to be a great victory and affirmed that the Federal Council yielded
only after having consulted with the members of the Federal Assembly .165 It
should be noted that in this domain, Switzerland had every interest in
reaching an agreement. Between September 1847 and March 1851, the
163
Feuillefederale suisse, 1855, vol. 2, "Rapport de la comrrussion du Conseil national,
chargee d'examiner le traite avec les Etats-Unis de I' Amerique du Nord," pp. 393/399.

164

Ibidem, p. 400 .

165
NA RG 59 / M37 (Dispatches from special agents, vol. 14, Dudley Mann), report from
Mann to the DS (Webster), November 30th , 1850; Feuille federal e suisse, 1850, vol. 3,
"Message accompagnant le Traite entre les Etats-Unis d' Amerique et la Confederation
suisse du 3 decembre 1850," pp. 640-647.
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Swiss consuls requested on three occasions the extradition of Swiss
criminals who had fled to the United States. In the absence of contractual
provisions, the American authorities refused to comply. 166

Epilogue: From the Golden Age to the Decline of Swiss-American
Relations

The Swiss-American Treaty of 1850: At the Zenith of the economic
Complementarity of the "sister Republics"
In the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, the relations
between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation
therefore substantially intensified. Favored by the steamboat and railroad,
the flows of merchandise, capital and persons became denser, in both
directions. To be sure, the political and ideological similarities between the
"sister Republics" played a role in this movement of intrication, but the
essential factor was the complementarity of the economic structures of the
two partners. Whereas the Swiss rural population acquired lands in the
United States, the American merchants and travelers who visited and
established themselves in Switzerland became more and more numerous. 167
Because of the rapid industrialization of the small Alpine state, the
agricultural economy of the United States found important outlets there. By
way of compensation, the Swiss luxury industry could export a large
quantity of its products to the United States. Native competition was almost
absent and the customs disarmament, which began in the 1830s, favored
Switzerland's exports. Finally, the heavy accumulation of capital realized in
Switzerland permitted important investments in the American infrastructures
and real estate values.
This intensification of human, commercial and capitalist flows provoked
needs in terms of political relations. First of all, this translated into the
166

The extradition demands of the consuls: NA RG 59 / M664 (Notes from Foreign
Consuls), roll 2, De Luze to Buchanan, September 13'\ 1847; ibidem, Cazenove to Clayton,
February 16'\ 1850; ibidem, Cazenove to Webster, March 15'\ 1851. The refusals of the
Department of State: NA RG 59 / M99 (Notes to Foreign Legations/ German States), roll
27, Buchanan to De Luze, September 17th , 1847; ibidem, Clayton to Cazenove, February
25 th , 1850; ibidem, Webster to Cazenove, March 18'\ 1851.
167

"We have considerable commercial relations with Switzerland. An immense American
travel passes annually through the cantons, and the want of the protection of a diplomatic
representation of the United States is sometimes felt. "; NA RG 59 I Reports of the Secretary
of State to the President and Congress 1790-1906 (Report book, vol. 6, p. 482), DS (Everett)
to Henry Bayly, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives,
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reciprocal establishment of consulates. The two governments also managed
to regulate the issues of inheritance in a first agreement signed in 1847. At
that date, however, an entire series of other problems remained to be dealt
with: the reciprocal freedom of establishment, commercial exchanges,
extradition of criminals, etc. The principal reason for this juridical void is to
be sought in the political system of the former Confederation. The extreme
federalism of the Pact of 1815 was in fact little compatible with the
conclusion of international treaties. Therefore it was necessary to await the
creation of the Federal State, in 1848, in order to unblock the situation. On
the American side, it then became urgent to protect the interests of the
American exporters against an eventual commercial reorientation of
Switzerland. The fear of seeing the new Confederation adhere to a customs
alliance was particularly strong.
With the new context of international politics resulting from the liberal
revolutions of 1848, a new dimension was added to Swiss-American
relations. Subjected to the pressure of the great reactionary powers, the
liberal Swiss Federal State sought to break its diplomatic isolation. The
Swiss authorities therefore accorded a great deal of importance to the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the powerful transatlantic sister as
well as to the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and friendship. On the
American side, any military intervention in favor of the liberal revolutions
was immediately excluded. The American authorities however were
determined to support these new movements by symbolic gestures. Beyond
the political and ideological sympathies, it was commercial issues which
prompted these actions. They were in fact convinced that American
economic penetration in Europe would be facilitated by the overthrow of the
conservative regimes. After the coup d'etat of December 1851 in France,
Switzerland became the last liberal bastion in Europe. From the American
point of view, intervention in its favor therefore assumed a scope which
surpassed the framework of bilateral relations.
Beginning in 1850, a veritable determination to reach the conclusion of a
treaty of commerce and friendship therefore existed on both sides of the
Atlantic. However, it was necessary to wait until 1855 for such an
agreement to be ratified. This delay is explained by the federal form of the
Swiss and American political systems. Although the Swiss Confederation
possessed thereafter a strengthened central power, the distribution of that
power remained very federalist and the cantons still possessed numerous
competencies, notably in the area of the establishment. In the United States,
the situation of domestic politics followed an inverse movement. With the
vague secessionist attempts of the slave States of the South, the tendency
was moving toward the weakening of the central power to the profit of
"States' rights." On the issue of the inheritance of real estate, the Senators .
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even reneged on certain concessions made to Switzerland in the agreement
of 1847.
The treaty of 1850/55 is therefore to be understood as a compromise
between two federal States desirous of consolidating considerable human
and economic relations, that in a political context favorable to their mutual
rapprochement. In his second message to the Senate, it was thus that
President Fillmore presented it: "The modification which the Government of
the Swiss Confederation is desirous of introducing into the amendments
made by the Senate of the United States and the articles affected by them are
not inconsistent with the object and the spirit of those amendments, and
appear to me to proceed upon a reasonable principle of compromise. " 168
The big losers in this compromise were the heirs of Swiss emigrants to the
United States, who risked not being able to enter into possession of a portion
of their inheritance, as well as the American Jewish merchants, to whom
continued to be forbidden the right of establishment in certain Swiss
cantons.
The American Crusade in favor of Jewish Emancipation in Switzerland
A vehicle of anti-Semitic discrimination, the Swiss-American treaty
would paradoxically contribute to the emancipation of the Swiss Jewish
population. In the summer of 1857, following the second expulsion of the
American Jewish citizen Gootman from La Chaux-de-Fonds, the American
Jewish community initiated a fourth polemic against the Swiss-American
treaty. The contemporary movement of opinion was of such magnitude that
President James Buchanan could not ignore it. 169 On October 31st , 1857, he
granted interviews to different Jewish delegations. 170 While refusing to
168

Cited in MILLER, HUNTER (ed.), op. cit., p. 890.

169
Beyond the problematics of the treaty is probably concealed a confrontation between
Whigs and Democrats, which had as its issue the Jewish electoral clientele. While the
spearhead of the attack against the government was a conservative newspaper, the defense
of the treaty was led by the New York Times, in alliance with the Democratic party in power.
Let us note as well that the Consul of Switzerland in New York, de Luze, who intervened
in the New York Herald of August 10th in order to defend the treaty, considered that political
issues were concealed behind the polemics: "The Jews of New York are doubtless vexed that
their coreligionists in Europe are not treated in many countries as are the Christians, but
it is also possible that the article which has appeared in the Herald, is the beginning of a
political maneuver for the presidential election of 1861 in order to assure the vote of the
Israelites in the United States for such and such a candidate who will take their interest to
heart."; Federal Archives, E2 1393, De Luze to the Federal Council, August 10'\ 1857.
110
The interview is related in National Intelligencer, November 3rd , 1857; The Sun,
November 6th , 1857. One of the memos sent to President Buchanan is published in Schappes,
op. cit., pp. 321-324.
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terminate the agreement, he undertook diplomatic action with the Swiss
authorities.
At the end of 1857, the American resident-minister in Berne received
instructions from Secretary of State Cass: "/ am directed by him (President
Buchanan, C.H.) to instruct you to use all the means in your power to effect
the removal of the odious restrictions complained of, which, it is
understood, are contained in the laws of but four of the Swiss cantons. " 171
At his post since 1853, Theodor Fay would demonstrate remarkable
adroitness and zeal in his campaign against Swiss anti-Semitism. 172
Considering that the route of pressure, already used by France, was doomed
to failure, the diplomat adopted a strategy of persuasion: "Switzerland is
justly sensitive as to the inte,ference of foreign powers, and can and will
concede more to forbearance than to threats (. .. ) After receiving the report
of the different cantonal legislatures, I shall endeavor to present the
question in so clear a light as to demonstrate that a more liberal course is
required by the dignity and even by the material interest of Switzerland
herself I hope also to procure a larger interpretation of the law in favor of
our fellow-citizens, that some practical benefit may immediately result. " 173
In the course of his investigation, Fay became aware of the depth of the antiSemitic prejudices which, contrary to the affirmations of the Federal
Council, were rooted in the compost of religious intolerance. He was
particularly shocked by the fact that certain Jews had to export the bodies of
their loved ones in order to be able to bury them. As for the cantonal
responses, their tone was far from being friendly. Certain even suggested to
the American authorities to look at the beam in their own eye, that is
slavery, before giving lessons on liberalism to Switzerland. 174 In May 1859,
171
Cited in Message from the President of the United States, transmitting information
relative to discriminations in Switzerland against citizens of the United States of the Hebrew
Persuasion, April 26'\ 1860. Printed as House Executive Document 17, 35th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1902, p. 12; instructions of November 5th , 1857.
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NEHER, Andre, "Une carte antisemite de la Suisse au XIXe," in Evidences, 27,
September-October 1952, pp. 40-44; MEIER, op. cit., pp. 58-66; WELDLER-STEINBERG ,
op. cit., pp . 66-77; Message from the President of the United States, transmitting information
relative to discriminations in Switzerland against citizens of the United States of the Hebrew
Persuasion, April 26 th , 1860. Printed as House Executive Document 17, 35th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1902; it should be noted that this document does not reproduce the totality of the
reports from Fay, but does suppress certain passages.
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The responses of the cantons are reproduced in Message from the President of the United
States, transmitting information relative to discriminations in Switzerland against citizens
of the United States of the Hebrew Persuasion, April 26'\ 1860. Printed as House Executive
Document 17, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, 1902.
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Fay was finally in a position to send to the Federal Council a "Memorandum
concerning the Admission of the Israelites of North America to
Establishment in Switzerland." Published in French and German, this
analysis of Swiss anti-Semitism had a significant impact on Switzerland . It
notably contributed to shaking up certain prejudices, among them the belief
in the danger of the Alsatian Jewish community.
Following the notes from France and Great Britain, which supported the
action of Fay, the Federal Council was confronted with the combined
pressure of three great powers. 175 Nonetheless, it remained firm in its
resolve, its only concession being to transmit the diplomatic notes to the
cantonal governments, with the recommendation to liberalize their
legislation toward the Jews. Within the country, however, certain economic
milieux came to consider article 41 to be an obstruction to Swiss expansion
in the international markets. In 1858, the failure of the treaty of commerce
with Persia, which refused to discriminate against its non-Christian
population, comforted them in this opinion. As for the American diplomats,
they saw a fissure in the Swiss anti-Semitic armor: "Should the Swiss nation
perceive that not only treaties with non-Christian governments, but with
such countries as the United States, were periled by the clause upon the
Jews, it would effect at least a change in the spirit and perhaps in the
legislation of the cantons. " 176 The effect produced by Fay's note on public
opinion did not disappoint theses expectations. Published February 9t\
1860, an article of the Schweizer Handels-Courier defended Fay's note and
highlighted the danger weighing upon Swiss commerce: "As an old
Republic, Switzerland should not allow itself to be given lessons on equality
either by its young sister across the Ocean or by monarchist states. (. .. ) The
few cantons which do not feel obliged through the activities of our high
authorities to throw overboard this old yeast of intolerance, should do this
so that the Federal Council, in concluding treaties with other states, does
not end up spending years haggling over Jew clauses, which, because they
are not compatible with our good social and industrial international
relations, will become more and more intolerable with time. We should hope

175
The British note, of December 28th , 1859, is published in Documents diplomatiques
suisses , op. cit., pp. 706-707; cf. also PRO FO 100 I 122 (1859) / 125 (1860), reports from
Herries to the FO (Russell)/ 16.12.1859 / 9.1.1860; the French note, of January 71\ 1860,
is reproduced in BRISAC , op. cit., pp. 40-42.
176
Message from the President of the United States, transmitting information relative to
discriminations in Switzerland against citizens of the United States of the Hebrew
Persuasion, April 26th , 1860. Printed as House Executive Document 17, 35th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1902, pp. 24-25; NA RG 59 / T364 (Dispatches from Basel), report from Endlich
to the DS (Cass), June 20 th , 1859.
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that the good example of Zurich will not remain fruitless. " 177 In the course
of the autumn of 1859, the Grand Council of Zurich did in fact undertake to
revise its legislation on establishment. The desire to preserve the very
important exports of silk goods to the United States was omnipresent in this
debate. In 1863, a new blow was delivered by the Netherlands. Following
the intervention of the Swiss Jewish community, the Parliament of this
country refused to ratify the treaty signed at the end of 1862 by the two
governments. 178
It was however France which would deliver the coup de grace and force
the Swiss authorities to yield. 179 After the Franco-British Treaty of 1860,
which opened a new era of free exchange in Europe, the conclusion of a
treaty of commerce with France became impera~ve for the principal export
sectors of the Swiss economy. So, from the beginning of the negotiations, in
May 1862, French diplomacy made the free establishment of her Jewish
citizens a condition sine qua non for the conclusion of such an agreement. 180
Confronted with the great size of the economic interests at stake, the Federal
Council yielded. France having made important customs concessions to the
Swiss exporters of cotton goods, silk goods, watches and cheeses, a
comfortable majority of the Federal Chambers supported the government.
Paris was worth a few constitutional improvisations ... The opposition to the
treaty was led by the conservative Catholic milieux of interior Switzerland,
which cried for a coup d'etat. Their leader, Philipp Anton von Segesser,
attacked the free establishment of the Jews with openly anti-Semitic
arguments: "Their hatred toward Christian society has remained the same,
but their power has grown infinitely. They sit on the steps of thrones which
are indebted to them, they rule the railroads and the great financial
institutions, which repose upon their wealth, they dictate the tone in the
177

The article is included in a report of Fay on the effects of his note ; NA RG 59 / T98
(Dispatches from Bern), report from Fay to the DS (Cass), February IO'\ 1860.
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WELDLER-STEINBERG, op. cit., pp. 79-81 ; KULLING , op. cit., pp. 36-41 ; Feuille
federale suisse, 1862, vol. I, "Message concernant des Conventions conclure avec le
Governement royal des Pays-Bas en matiere d'etablissement , de commerce , de douane et
de consulat s," pp. 274-279 .

a

179
On the negotiation of the Franco-Swiss Treaty of 1864, cf. BRAND Urs , Die
schwei zerisch-fran zosischen Unterhandlungen fiber einen Handelsv ertrag und der Abschluss
des Vertragswerkes von 1864 . Bern, 1968; GERN Philippe , ARLETTAZ , Silvia, Relation s
franco-suisses . La confroniation de deux politiques economiques , Geneva , 1993, pp. 49-81 ;
HUMAIR, op. cit., pp. 245-264 ; BRISAC , op. cit., pp. 43-55 ; WELDLER-STEINBERG ,
op. cit., pp. 135-140.
180
May 19th 1862, French diplomacy communicated the conditions placed upon an
agreement by the government; Feuille federale suisse, 1864, vol. 2, "Message concernant
un traite de commerce et d'etablissement avec la France du 15 juillet 1864," pp. 258-259 .
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daily press and in literature, they intrude into the highest and the lowest
levels of social life and the goal which they consciously pursue is the
destruction of Christian society, the destruction of Christian civilization; it
is their purpose in life, the foundation of their religion, which represents to
them everything which other peoples consider to be the fatherland, the state
and the law. " 181
By consenting to important commercial sacrifices, France therefore
succeeded, from 1864 onward, in obtaining the free establishment of foreign
Jews benefiting from a treaty. In 1866, a partial revision of the constitution
granted the freedom of establishment to Jews of Swiss nationality. At the
time of the same vote, the extension of liberty of conscience and worship to
non-Christians was nonetheless refused by 160,992 votes against 157,629.
The latter was finally granted in 1874, at the time of the total revision of the
constitution, which consecrated the definitive emancipation of the Swiss
Jewish population. The actual application of the principle of equality would
however take several more years, certain cantons demonstrating much bad
will in modifying their legislation.
Chill in Swiss-American Relations: the Questioning of the Treaty of 1850
After 1857, the golden age of Swiss-American relations reached its end.
To be sure, the republican lyricism remained, but more pragmatic rapports
were instituted between the two States, which resulted in a series of
tensions. Despite the strategy of persuasion adopted by minister Fay, his
conduct in favor of the American Jews greatly displeased the Federal
Council. In a note of May 14th , 1858, the Swiss government denounced what
it considered to be an American interference in its domestic affairs. 182 It
announced that it would henceforth refuse to intercede in favor of rejected
American Jews. Therefore, the cantonal policies on the issue of
establishment and religious liberty continued to be very restrictive. Fay
demanded in vain a liberal application of the treaty of 1855; the cases of
expulsion and discrimination against American citizens multiplied.
The meanness of the Swiss authorities reached its zenith in 1861, at the
time of the Bernays and Wolff affairs. These were two American
consuls-the first Christian of Jewish descent, the second Jewish-who
181

Rede des Herrn Nationalrath Dr. von Segesser betrejfend diefranzosisch-schweizerischen
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Schwyz, 1864, p. 17.
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were refused the exequatur for several weeks: "The delay in granting the
Exequatur grew out of the report that Mr. Wolff is a Jew-Basel being one
of the Swiss Cantons most bigotedly devoted to the persecution of these
adhering children of Abraham. Mr. Wolff's name was especially against
him-since Wolff is a sort of generic, in Europe, for Jew. " 183 During the
second half of the 1850s, Fay likewise had to fight against the expulsion of
American citizens of Methodist religion. At that time it was confirmed that
the liberty of worship inscribed in the Constitution of 1848 was very
relative, because it did not even assure an equitable treatment for its fellow
Christian citizens, and that in the liberal cantons of Zurich, Berne and BaselCity. In the area of emigration, finally, the American authorities complained
that certain Swiss communes financed the emigration of the poor and exconvicts, thus transferring their social burdens to the United States. The
threat of a hardening of American legislation was thus agitated on several
occasions.
On the Swiss side, the merchant class was bothered by even more
complex and costly export formalities. With the eruption of the Civil War,
the blockade on cotton imposed on the States of the South posed grave
problems of supply for the Swiss industrialists. In the opposite sense, the
Swiss luxury products had more and more difficulty crossing the customs
barriers set up to finance the war effort. The utilization of smuggling only
increased the tensions. Finally, the evolution of the political situation in
Europe also contributed to chilling Swiss-American relations. With the
resolution of the Neuchatel affair, in May 1857, the threat of military
intervention in Switzerland was definitively removed. The necessity to
handle carefully the "sister Republic," because of imperatives of
international policy, was therefore less and less pressing, that on both sides
of the Atlantic.
Fruit of the political upheavals of the years 1847-1857, the treaty ratified
in 1855 was rapidly questioned by American diplomacy. Beginning in the
month of May 1858, Fay threatened the Federal Council with a denunciation
of the agreement: "It is true the United States government has no right to
interfere in the international legislation of Switzerland , but it has,
undoubtedly, a right to inquire into the value of the treaty, and it appears
that this grievance might, without any comparative inconvenience, be, in a
considerable degree, remedied by a simple readiness to examine both sides
of the subject, and if Switzerland refuses to show that friendly readiness, it
would then be proper for the undersigned to lay the case before his
government for its consideration, with his opinion that the complaint of the
American Israelites is equitable, and grows out of wrongs inflicted upon
183
NA RG 59 / T98 (Dispatches from Bern), report from Fogg to the OS (Seward),
September 13th, 1861.
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them without sufficient motive, in defense of which no argument can be used
which cannot be shown to be without foundation. " 184 However, it was
necessary to await October 1860 for Fay to officially request a renegotiation
of the treaty. 185 The eruption of the Civil War, then the resolution of the
question of the establishment of the American Jews, nonetheless contributed
to burying this measure. The treaty of 1855 thus remained unchanged until
1900, upon which date the exceptional customs advantages granted to
Switzerland were withdrawn.
From the Atlantic Perspective to the North-South Axis: Reorientation of
Swiss Foreign Policy
Despite the conclusion of the treaty of 1850 and its ratification in 1855,
the relative importance of the United States in the foreign relations of
Switzerland tended to diminish after 1860.186 In a more general manner, the
Atlantic triangle formed with Anglo-Saxon countries, of liberal tendencies,
Great Britain and the United States, became less decisive than in the first
half of the nineteenth century. It yielded in importance to the North-South
axis-Germany-Switzerland-Italy-which
became the main line of Swiss
foreign policy until the Second World War. The decade of the 1860s marked
in fact an important change of paradigm in the international positioning of
Switzerland. On the political level, the weakening of the United States, torn
apart by the Civil War, contrasted with the birth of modem Italy (1861) and
the affirmation of Prussia, which militarily overcame Austria (1866) and
France (1870). After the proclamation of the German Empire, Germany
became the most dynamic political and military power in Europe.
On the commercial level, the Swiss economy profited from the
liberalization of the European customs policies, driven from the end of the

184
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Principal Markets of Swiss Exports in Percents 1845 - 1995. 187

1840s by England, in order to reorient massively its exports toward the
markets of the Old Continent. Toward 1860, the share of the Americas in
Swiss exports was not more than 22%. The effects of the American Civil
War-decrease in buying power, customs protectionism, development of
native industry-only accentuated the movement. After a period of FrancoGerman balance, during the years 1870-1880, Switzerland ' s number one
commercial partner became Germany, which also became the most dynamic
economic power in Europe. The treaties of 1891 and 1904 made of
Switzerland a sort of "junior partner" of the German economy. 188 Between
1840 and 1912, the share of the United States and Germany in Swiss exports
went respectively from 25 to 10% and from 8 to 23%.
This loss of relative importance did not prevent the Atlantic exports from
progressing in real value. Because of the strong American industrial
competition, the latter were limited more and more to luxury products of
great quality. On the financial level, Swiss and German capital were
intimately interdependent, notably in the dynamic sectors of railroads and
187
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the electrical industry. On the level of migrations, the United States
remained an important location for Swiss peasants who refused to become
members of the proletariat, but other destinations, such as Argentina and
Brazil, grew in importance as well. Beginning with the end of the 1880s, the
Swiss migratory balance became positive and a strong German and Italian
wave of immigration came to compensate for a lack of labor. On the cultural
level, finally, Germany and its intellectual radiance were fascinating. The
German universities and technical schools attracted more and more of the
Swiss elite, whereas numerous German professors came to teach in
Switzerland. This evolution provoked changes in the political culture, which
were more and more influenced by authoritarianism and Prussian militarism.
The crisis of liberalism , which was accentuated by the Great Depression of
the 1880s and the rise of the worker movement, only accentuated this
phenomenon. 189
In 1850, at the time of the signature of the first version of the SwissAmerican treaty, the Neue Zurcher Zeitung indicated the primacy of the
Atlantic relations thus: "Even if the message of the President of the
Confederation concerning the treaty with the United States uses a more
impassioned tone than the usual style of the chancelleries permits, it is only
the jealousy of those who would like to see Switzerland play the role of a
zone of German influence rather than to see it give a liberating handshake
to brother Jonathan, which can be offended by it and nonetheless, everyone
who is not blind can only confirm the fact that Switzerland, concerning its
politics, its trade and its way of life, is much closer to the North Americans
than to its German neighbors. " 190 The American agent Mann was at that
time received as a savior by the Swiss liberals. In 1912, it was then the
Emperor of Germany, Wilhelm 11, who received a triumphant welcome
when he visited Switzerland. The influence of Germany was such in those
days that, following the signature of the Gothard agreement, in 1910, a
portion of the press of Suisse romande feared for the independence of
Switzerland. It was only after the Second World War, when the United
States ascended to the ranks of a world superpower , in a context of cold war,
that the "sister Republic" would progressively once again become the model
to follow. 19 1
Cedric Humair
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Editor's Note:
The present article has been translated by myself, Dr. Dwight Page, Editor
of the SAHS Review.
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